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PREDICTIONS have been freely made of a pending German peace offensive, which will break some time in the near future; and during the past week persistent rumors of the offer of definite terms have been circulated and denied. The denials are more credible than the rumors. That the German government will start peace discussions just as soon as the military situation is in their opinion sufficiently favorable is most probable; but we doubt very much whether the discussion will be initiated until it is more clearly established whether the armed offensive is or is not a success. As the situation now stands the German army must either go forward or go back. No peace negotiations can make much headway until the line in France has returned to a condition of comparative stability—until, that is, either the German army has triumphantly broken the future offensive power of its Allied enemies or until it has retired to a line which can be held safely against any probable attack of the Allied army in its present or proximate strength. Neither is the political situation more favorable to an early peace offensive than the military. The German government during the winter and the spring has managed with wonderful success not only to infuse physical and moral unity into its enemies but to make the moral endurance of its own people and allies depend upon the precarious chances of a military decision. If its army fails to win a decision, the task of rebuilding in Central Europe the defense morale, which will then be needed, looks almost impossible.

LAST fall the German overtures for peace were dangerous because they were ostensibly dictated by the willingness to give and to accept a settlement based on the non-imperialist no-annexations-and-no-indemnities formula. But in the Russian treaties the German government repudiated the Reichstag resolution and committed itself to a policy which clearly subordinated political to military strategy. A peace offensive founded on the Brest-Litovsk treaties could be successful only in case France, Great Britain and Italy were incapable of further fighting or were induced to connive at German aggrandizement in the east by concessions in the west, in Asia Minor, and in Africa. Considering the general and natural desire of all the European nations to put an end to their sufferings, there is always a chance that the German government can eventually buy compromise peace of this kind, and for a while the attitude of the British government, as revealed in the speeches of its Prime Minister, indicated a disposition to turn Russia and Poland over to Germany. This was a suicidal policy, because, as Lord Robert Cecil recently declared, "If they (the Germans) once really established themselves in Russia there is no reason why they should not fight the whole world forever." The German government cannot succeed in obtaining a compromise peace provided our own government stands firm and acts with sufficient vigor. It must be willing and able to offer to its European associates an army which will be strong enough in 1919 to have a good chance of driving the German army back. It must guarantee to the

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Allies a military victory sufficient to render a compromise peace unnecessary. Under the circumstances and for the time being the utmost energy of American military preparation will constitute the most unanswerable answer to the pending German peace overtures.

THAT the administration has every intention of concentrating in France at the earliest possible moment all the military force it can muster is sufficiently indicated by the War Department's demand for the right to draft as many men as it can train and supply. Secretary Baker's demand merely puts into concrete form the President's recent threat to use "unlimited force" against Germany. We trust it will be followed up by measures, such as those suggested by General Crowder, to take stock of the American man power, to prevent its employment in wasteful and futile ways and to organize it to the best possible military and social advantage of the nation. The additional millions which may be needed in France before the work of the American army is done cannot be taken away from their present employment without disaster unless at the same time a careful plan is put into operation which will transfer labor from less essential to more essential industries and which will accomplish this result without unnecessary discontent and disturbance. It is very well to promise "unlimited force" to our Allies for the purpose of preventing the triumph of German militarism, but if we are to supply unlimited force even to a liberal but limited extent the task will involve much more thoroughgoing and carefully planned organization of American economic and social strength than any which has yet been attempted.

ASSUMING that the German peace offensive fails because of the confidence felt by our Allies in the competence of American military preparations, the administration will have a good chance of bringing the war to a successful conclusion, but it will still have to adopt one difficult but essential political precaution. It will need to insist upon an inter-Allied statement of war aims, which will re-inforce the closer military and economic cooperation of the Allies with more complete political cooperation. The needed statement of war aims could be based upon the programme of the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, which embodied better than any other document the lessons of the harsh but illuminating political experience of the past few years. With a programme of this kind affixed to the international bill-boards, the Allies could at the proper time conduct a military offensive, which would at the same time carry with it all the beneficial results of a political counter-offensive against Germany. For when the German government is ready to accept the proposed terms, it will be acknowledging its own defeat without, as a penalty of the acknowledgment, doing anything to impair the future security of the German nation.

IF the United States Steel Corporation reaches as a result of the conferences begun in Washington this week an agreement with organized labor, American democracy can place to its credit one of the clearest victories of the war. The labor policy of the Steel Corporation has always been deliberately and irreconcilably anti-unionist. Beginning in 1902 it began the work of suppressing unionism in its plants and on its boats and docks, and some years later it had almost completely succeeded. Its management proposed to break the collective bargaining power of its employees and force each individual worker to negotiate as best he could with the largest and most powerful corporation in the world. Its policy has earned the Steel Corporation the distrust and the resentment of organized labor, and it would have resulted eventually in one of the bitterest and most costly strikes in the history of the country. Apparently this policy is now to be revised. If the essential minimum of collective bargaining and non-discrimination can be embodied in an agreement, the worst obstacle will be removed to the establishment of civilized constitutional government in the steel industry and to the growth throughout the country of a more conciliatory spirit in the relations between employer-organizations and the unionized wage-earners. That the needed agreement will be reached seems probable in view of the principles of labor adjustment recently promulgated by the War Labor Board. Incidentally the result will constitute a triumph for the far-sighted labor policy of Secretary Baker, for it would mean the acceptance by the Steel Corporation of the provisions which last summer and fall it obdurately refused to insert in its contracts with the government.

WHEN the food administration was organized shrewd political observers predicted freely that Mr. Hoover's tenure of office would be brief. It was urged that all manner of interests would find themselves aggrieved by the food regulations. It was predicted that farmers would be discontented with the price-fixing plan of the food administration and would reduce production. Millers and bakers were expected to cry out against the plans for regulating their margins and the distribution of supplies. It was further predicted that the food administration would fail of substantial results because it had not the effective power to

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check waste and to control prices to the ultimate consumer. Fortunately for the American people, all these predictions have proved false. The farmers may think the price of wheat too low, but they have sown a greater acreage to wheat than ever before in our history. With a tolerably satisfactory season we shall have a large surplus for export to our Allies. The millers and bakers have as a rule accepted Hoover's decrees without inquiring too closely into the question whether they could really be enforced. There is not a shadow of doubt that the ultimate consumer gets his bread much cheaper than he could have obtained it if we had relied upon the free play of competition for our price regulation. Out of a nation of wasters we have been transformed into a people who regard the waste of food as a sin. War bread is on every table, and the wheat thus saved has been shipped in great volume to our Allies. Hoover has succeeded beyond the hopes of his friends and his enemies have been confounded.

NEVERTHELESS one frequently hears the assertion that Mr. Hoover is the most unpopular man in the country. We are credibly informed that Mr. Hoover shares this view. But the popularity of a man who sinks himself in his work is something that is very difficult to gauge. A comprehensive collection of newspaper comment on the food administration might easily exhibit more blame than praise. Newspaper comment, however, lives largely upon protest, while contentment is usually inarticulate. A consensus of opinion of that small minority of Americans who write and speak might conceivably show surface indications of antagonism to Hoover. But this would prove nothing as to the state of mind of the great mass of the people. To determine how Hoover really stands with the people we must go deeper. Ask the average housewife whether she fears for the future food supply of her family. She will answer that she does not, and if you inquire further into her confidence in the future, you will almost certainly find that it depends upon her faith in the food administration. Ask the average farmer, who toils much and says little, whether he was not bitterly disappointed over the failure of two dollar and a half wheat. He will reply that he feels that he ought to have more for his labor, but he believes that the food administration is trying to be fair: it is helping to win the war, and that is the main thing. Just try a few such inquiries among the plain people: you will be convinced, as we are, that there is a more universal confidence in Mr. Hoover than in any other servant of the American people except the President. This may not be popularity, but it is something infinitely more worth while.

UNREST in the Central Powers waxes or wanes with the hope of victory. Just now there are many evidences that discontent is on the increase. In any circumstances the defeat of franchise reform in the Prussian Diet would have given rise to popular mutterings. But the socialist and liberal papers would hardly have been so outspoken in their condemnation of Junker obstinacy if German arms had continued to carry everything before them on the western front. The food situation remains serious in spite of such meagre Russian supplies as are in sight, and this fact is exerting its natural effect upon a people fed too liberally with promises. At the same time the German agriculturists grow restive under the knowledge that their government is paying a third more for Russian grain than it allows them to demand. The business classes are alive to the fact that only indemnities or a miracle can save the tottering structure of German finance. The political situation is one that must certainly grow more difficult as the hope of victory recedes farther and farther from sight. The present government is navigating perilous waters. But we cannot therefore predict an early change in the direction of liberalism. By the rule that a political system declining toward its end displays a last burst of its most characteristic energy, we are justified in anticipating yet another period in which the military reactionaries of Germany will appear to hold undisputed control of the state.

THE affairs of Austria are in a much more serious condition. The adjournment of the Austrian parliament would be a ground for grave anxiety to the government, even if the official reason, general dissatisfaction with the food situation, were the real reason for this action. There is abundant evidence that the nationality question is presenting greater difficulties than even the economic question. All through the war the Czechs have remained irreconcilable toward any solution falling short of independence. The Jugoslav movement, on the other hand, was apparently not so far advanced, in the first years of the war, that a compromise solution through constitutional reform was out of the question. But in recent months the Jugoslavs have attained to a degree of national self consciousness that rivals Czech nationalism. It is no longer possible even for German propagandists to maintain that the desire for Jugoslav union and independence is limited to the intellectual minority. The Slovenes are the branch of the Jugoslav race most remote from the centre of Jugoslav nationalism and most recently awakened to the common national aspiration, yet they are now flocking together in vast throngs to hear

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revolutionary addresses and signing petitions for independence. One such petition is said to bear the signatures of 200,000 Slovene women, and the total Slovene population is only a million and a quarter. It is not difficult to believe that the Hapsburg monarchy views the prolongation of the war with apprehension. It cannot hold out indefinitely against the attacks of the revolutionary nationalities, which make up after all a majority of the subjects of the empire.

BRITISH taxation revenues for the current fiscal year amount to $3,391,000,000, yet Britain has no more than one-third of the wealth and income of the United States. If we were bearing a correspondingly heavy burden of taxation, the receipts would approach ten billions, instead of the five billions that now represent our maximum expectation. As a nation we are shirking the obligation of paying as we go to the extent of our ability. For this our only excuse is that we are still in a stage of transition between a peace footing and a war footing. In the next elections, however, we ought to send to Congress men who will not be afraid to levy drastic taxes. Earned incomes are now paying without protest an excess profits tax of eight per cent in addition to all income taxes. Surely unearned incomes will bear a similar impost. The super taxes on incomes above a modest minimum can be greatly increased; excess profits taxes can also be made to yield much heavier revenues, and the inheritance tax could well be developed into an exceedingly productive source of revenue. When the war is over, the nation that has met the largest proportion of its expenditures through taxation will most easily weather the crisis of reconstruction.

Ending the Socialist Schism

WHEN the American nation was forced by the unlimited submarine campaign to declare war against Germany, there was one flaw in its national unity which had not existed in the case of the European belligerents. The declaration of war was condemned in unmeasured terms by one organized political party, that of the Socialists. In the case of France, Great Britain, Russia and Germany the majority of the Socialist parties had rallied to the support of their national governments and only a small minority persisted in opposition. In the case of the United States a large majority of the Socialist party opposed the national government and only a small minority supported it. The difference between the behavior of the Socialists here and in Europe was the more extraordinary because the grievance of this country against Germany was clearer if not greater than that of her European enemies. The United States had not been a party to any of the controversies in which the great war originated. Its government had exhausted every honorable means of avoiding hostilities, and had yielded only when the German government carried the war into neutral territory whose inviolability was necessary to American safety by establishing a reign of terror on the high seas. Finally when it did declare war, its government subordinated the use of military force in the most explicit and irrevocable way to the realization of a healing programme of international reorganization.

The action of the American Socialist majority in condemning participation in the war by the American nation has been followed by two highly significant and apparently contradictory consequences. In the only two important elections which were held during the year, one for the New York mayoralty, and the other for the Wisconsin senatorship, Socialist candidates, who had both declared in favor of immediate peace negotiations, were supported by approximately twenty-five per cent of the voters instead of the less than ten per cent, which they had formerly polled. This result looked as if there were a larger peace-at-any-price minority in the United States than in any of the other fighting nations, and it appeared that there was a serious and increasing pacifist movement in at least two important states and that American Socialism instead of being weakened by its repudiation of a war to safeguard democracy was actually earning as a consequence thereof a gradually increasing popularity.

Yet these apparently obvious inferences were far from being true. Although the Socialist vote increased substantially, the effective moral resistance within the party to the war has steadily diminished. Many Socialists who began by disbelieving in the possibility of divorcing American war aims from the imperialist purposes of some of the European enemies of Germany have been converted by President Wilson's diplomacy; and during the winter their conversion was confirmed by the revelation in the Brest-Litovsk treaties of the kind of peace Germany would impose upon a helpless and inoffensive republic. That whole division of the Socialist party which consists in immigrants from Russia, which works for the most part in the garment trades, and which voted solidly for Hillquit last fall, has come to realize that the one best chance of saving the Russian Revolution from the strangle-hold of Germany is derived from the political programme and the fighting power of the American nation. American Social-

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ism is far more deeply divided against itself and is far more disposed to justify resistance to Germany than was the case a year ago.

The combination between the self-revelation of the German ruling class and President Wilson's democratic diplomacy has consequently created among American Socialists a state of mind which, if intelligently exploited, could reduce to negligibility Socialist opposition to the war. But as yet neither the administration itself nor its official and extra-official agents have done anything to take advantage of this opportunity. On the contrary, a course has been adopted in dealing with domestic public opinion which places as many obstacles as possible in the way of cooperation by the Socialists with the government. The deliberate intention and the manifest result of much of the propaganda conducted for the war by candidates for office, by government agents and by patriotic societies, has not been to conciliate opposition but to exaggerate it, not to secure willing converts but to browbeat and scare hesitating people into a reluctant and aggrieved silence or hostility, not to promote national unity but to intensify national dissension. The Hillquit and Berger vote, in spite of the Hillquit and Berger platforms, was not cast for the most part by disloyalists. It was cast by citizens who cherished certain scruples about war in general and in particular about American intervention in a European war, which until recently were considered entirely reputable. The President has done much to overcome these scruples and can still almost entirely succeed, provided only he is sustained by ordinary American patriotic agitation. But ordinary American patriotic agitation—the agitation of the majority of the newspapers and public speakers—instead of sustaining him has not only served to consolidate Socialist support behind the Bergers and the Hillquits but to drive into the Socialist camp thousands of voters who only required a propaganda informed by the spirit and method of the President's policy in order to be converted into sound, loyal and resolute supporters of the government.

Hence it is that the Socialist vote, cast for candidates who were running on a platform of immediate peace negotiations, has increased, in spite of the fact that the body of definite anti-war opinion has been steadily shrinking. In supporting Hillquit and Berger, many voters were protesting not against fighting Germany but against using war upon Germany as an excuse for persecuting and browbeating loyal Americans. They were protesting against the savage intolerance, the irreconcilable and indiscriminate race hatred, the class violence and aggrandizement, and the sheer military-mindedness which were being propagated under cover of the war and as a part of war propaganda. They were protesting against that small but vociferous class of Americans who at a critical moment in our history proposed to throw away the spirit of hospitality, liberalism, toleration and fair-play which had always been the most commendable aspect of our national tradition, and substitute for it a spirit of vindictive nationalist exclusiveness.

This alienation from the war of a large body of voters who are not separated from the government by any immediately important difference of conviction, is most injurious to the national cause and should not be allowed to continue. How can it be brought to an end? In our opinion there is just one practicable way. Those Socialist leaders who in the beginning opposed the war but are now prevented from vigorous support of it chiefly by the moral violence which is being committed under its protection, should bury their grievances and come out actively and conspicuously in support of the administration. Only by so doing can they obliterate the consequences of their former opposition to the war and rob the advocate of persecution and violence of his most effective material. These Socialist leaders should remember the violence with which they on their side formerly condemned American entrance into the war and the justifiable resentment which the wording of the first Socialist protest provoked among loyalists. They should remember the debt of reparation which they owe to the administration for their failure to accept in good faith Mr. Wilson's declaration of his intention of associating American belligerency with a democratic political programme. The administration has done much to promote the internationalism in which they believe, despite their own hostility to its aims, and the sooner and more explicitly they come out frankly in its support, the stronger will be their own position as against the propagandists of race and class violence.

Above all, the Socialist leaders should bear in mind the dangerous consequences of protesting against the propaganda of violence and hatred by setting up and voting for pacifist candidates. When they adopt this method they deprive the administration of united liberal support in its fight against Germany and so compel it to depend increasingly upon the assistance of reactionaries. But when they work for the administration and support its candidates, they place Mr. Wilson in a much stronger position to dispense, whenever it may be desirable to do so, with the aid of their irreconcilable opponents and his own. They pass on to the patrioteers and the I. W. W. the privilege of embodying a spirit of maximalist irreconcilability, and they discredit their enemies far

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more effectually than they would by running opposition candidates. It is good policy on their part to push American reactionaries into the situation of opposing the American government during the prosecution of the war, and into this situation many of the more violent of the patrioteers are rapidly drifting. While professing to support Mr. Wilson the latter condemn as more or less " criminally culpable " practically every aspect of his domestic and foreign policy. They are attacking his personal assistants such as Mr. Baker, Mr. Creel and others with the same violence and lack of discrimination as they attack pro-war internationalists. If they continue in this state of mind, it will land them in open opposition to the administration and in the advocacy of a policy of aggressive and violent nationalism in foreign no less than in domestic affairs.

Those Socialist leaders who understand the impossibility of making peace with Germany as long as she insists on the eastern treaties have in our opinion a clear course to pursue during the coming congressional campaign. Wherever possible they should support Democratic candidates who can be trusted to stand by the administration and who exhibit progressive and liberal tendencies. If they feel the Democratic nominee to be impossible or untrustworthy they should run a pro-war, pro-administration Socialist candidate. For the rest they should publicly repudiate all candidates such as Berger, who seek an early peace because it will be a German peace and propose the withdrawal of American troops from France so that the German army can win a victory. It is only by separating themselves sharply from their former political associates who are unable to understand the indispensable political functions of the American army in France at this crisis in the world's history that they can carry really effective assistance to the administration. And the carrying of assistance to President Wilson should be their most absorbing preoccupation. They may be able to accomplish much of their own programme with his assistance. They can accomplish nothing without him. His administration, in spite of all its mistakes and the stupidity of many of its measures of repression, has fought against the spread of reactionary maximalist violence, and it will do better in this respect provided it can obtain united liberal support. That is what Mr. Wilson needs in order to strengthen his arm against the enemies of his programme in Germany, in France and England and in this country. If the American Socialists help to give it to him, they will be at once accepting the leadership of their associates in the European democracies and removing the worst obstacle to their future increase of influence in this country.

Possible Military Developments

PROPHECY, it has been said, is a gratuitous form of error, but without essaying prophecy it is interesting to speculate on possible military developments of the war—especially interesting perhaps to the American people who are to play so great a part in the later stages. Not only is it interesting but even if we go badly wrong it may be helpful because it will at any rate assist us to get current events in their right perspective. The Germans have now tried all ways of breaking down the Allied resistance in the west. The first was by a double converging movement on Paris, through Belgium and over the heights of the Meuse. This was defeated by General Castelnau at Nancy and General Joffre on the Marne. The second way was by an attempt to occupy the French coast at the Narrows, the battle which the Germans call the Battle of Calais and the English the first Battle of Ypres—incomparably the best defense that any army has yet made in this war. The third way was again by the Meuse heights and the operations against Verdun, in which General Pétain won undying fame. The fourth way is the present German offensive.

Prepared plans are rarely adhered to very strictly, and the German plans for this offensive have undergone a certain amount of modification. Their first idea was to advance on Paris down the valley of the Oise after separating the British army from the French. Their second idea after the gap made by the Battle of St. Quentin had been stopped was to capture Amiens and reach the sea by the Somme. Yet a third idea was a reversion with modifications to their plans of the offensive in the first battle of Ypres. Recently they have been trying to turn the southern flank of the Ypres positions by an advance down the valley of the Lys thereby remaking the old Ypres salient which General Haig got rid of last year and also by making a new and dangerous salient at Arras.

It is too early yet to attempt a forecast of these operations. At present the British line seems likely to hold and the temporary disorganization caused by the breakdown of the fifth army at St. Quentin has been repaired. Further north, the Germans have never done so well as at the southern end of our line, and in the valley of the Lys the British resistance seems to be more than usually tough. But evidently it is neck or nothing with the Germans. Their dearest object is to destroy the British army and to seize the Narrows, and it is quite likely that the attack south of Ypres will be succeeded by a stronger attack on the north side, all with the same object of turning the British positions in Flanders and winning their way to the sea. On

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the other hand, if they find the resistance here too tough they may suddenly fling their strength once more against the southern end of the British line or against the French. They want to create as many weak points as possible on the western front, trusting to their power of manoeuvre and rapid movement to deceive us as to the exact point at which they will make their main and as they hope their decisive thrust. Let us suppose for the sake of speculation that the Germans in spite of enormous losses are able to keep up the pressure for several months longer; that they continue to gain ground and that the stubbornness of their attacks continues to get the better of the stubbornness of British defense. At what point will their advance and the expenditure of life have justified itself? So far it has not. The Germans claim successes, and they have won a great deal of valuable ground, but they do not yet talk of victory, still less a decisive victory. What would make a decisive victory? How much better than they have done will they still have to do before their present successes develop into a chance of victory in the war?

They have no chance of victory so long as America can put her millions of men into France; indeed, their present successes unless they destroy America's power to deploy her armies in France are less than nothing to her for they will merely have reduced the German army of two millions and a half to half its strength, and no one seriously believes that the Austrians will come in very great numbers to the west front or will be of first rate military value if they do. What then would prevent us Americans from deploying our military strength in France? Not the mere separation of the French and British armies, for it would be dangerous to the enemy to spread himself over France with two armies in being on his flanks, each supported from the sea. Not the capture of Paris or of Amiens or even of LeHavre giving full access to the sea. New German submarines bases on the north coast of France would undoubtedly increase the difficulties of sea transport but not beyond the power of Allied countermeasures to deal with. Nothing less would suffice than the destruction of either the British or the French armies or their confinement within an area so narrow that reinforcements could not debouch from it.

Destruction is of course a relative term, for no army so great in size is ever destroyed in a literal sense. It is, however, destroyed for the purpose of this argument if it so completely loses morale as to be incapable of fighting except with heavy odds in its favor. Whatever may be the faults of the British army system there is happily no trace of the slightest loss of morale. But undoubtedly if the German pressure could be continued long enough and the British army forced back far enough, a point would at last be reached at which no number of reinforcements could restore the situation. When that point is reached but not before the Germans could fairly claim to have justified their present offensive.

What then is the absolute minimum ground which the British army must continue to hold (if the worst comes to the worst) or practically acknowledge defeat? It should include enough ground from which to develop an attack on a fifty mile front like that of the Germans on March 21st. If there is to be any freedom of manoeuvre at all you would need a perimeter of ninety or one hundred miles and the diameter of that circle would need to be sixty miles. In other words, you would need to be left an amount of territory in France that would lie within a half circle drawn from Calais as the centre and thirty miles as radius. Such a semi-circle would include Dunkirk on the north side, Boulogne on the side south of Calais. Inland the circumference would pass west of Poperinghe through Hazebrouck or near it and so to the coast near Boulogne. Ypres lies outside the circle and so do Poperinghe, Béthune, Lens and Arras.

The British army could lose all these places without suffering a decisive defeat. On the other hand if it were driven much nearer the coast than Hazebrouck on the thirty miles radius from Calais it would begin to be besieged there, and the channel coast would cease to be a suitable basis of any future offensive operations. The British government might even have to withdraw large portions of its armies from the Channel ports and transfer them elsewhere, leaving large enough garrisons to prevent them from being occupied by the enemy. We are far enough as yet from such developments as these, but even if they came there would be no reason for despondency. The Germans would not have defeated the Allies, they would not even have destroyed the British army; they would, however, have reduced their own army by a million, and they would have to deal with a French army practically still intact with the command of the sea assured and immense reinforcements on their way from America. It is most unfortunate that the German blows should have been delivered at parts of the British line where the area available for retreat is so small. But small as it is it may still be large enough.

Thus even if the worst came to the worst Germany's military prospects would still not be good. She would have used up in driving back the British army far more than the amount of reinforcements that she has been able to draw from the Russian front. She would still be in no better position in

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France than she was at the beginning of the war when the French army with the assistance of a handful of British troops managed to hold the military strength of Germany. However great the losses that it endures, the British army will still be an extremely powerful instrument of war and the relative strength of the Allied armies to the German will, thanks to America, be far greater than it was in the first eighteen months of the war even when Russia was fighting actively on our side. Dark as the outlook is, no one in England thinks of defeat as a possibility, and no one in the United States need think of it either.

A Boycott of Germany

IN history the boycott has served almost exclusively as the last resource of the weak and the defeated. It was first employed with a modicum of success by the miserable tenantry of a rack-rented district of Ireland, who endowed it with name and fame to travel abroad and to reanimate the hopes of groups beaten in economic or political conflicts. In America we have become familiar with the boycott as an incident of unsuccessful labor struggles, as a chief arm in the curious arsenal of organizations like the Knights of Labor that lacked really effective power. The boycott has been used to bolster up a forlorn hope by the Hindu nationalists; it has been employed by the Chinese, helpless in the face of occidental injury and insult, and by the Turks in vain protest against Italian aggressions in Tripoli. And now it is proposed that America and her Allies should unite to penalize Germany by a boycott of German goods after the war.

It would be going too far to assert that the project of a boycott of Germany is supported chiefly by those who despair of winning the war, although the volume of boycott discussion tends to increase whenever the temporary success of German arms appears to postpone the day of Allied victory. There are naturally millions of persons in the Allied countries who find it hard to conceive that they can ever again willingly enter into civil relations with a people who have inflicted upon them losses for which there can be no reparation. Many a man whose son has been killed in France will for a long time, if not for life, regard Germany and all her works with aversion. He will not limit his repugnance to wares that are characteristically German, but will avoid even staple wares that he knows to be of German origin. A corresponding prejudice against American and British and French wares will be manifested by Germans who have lost sons and brothers in the war. And traders in every country will exploit this sentiment, to facilitate the sale of their own wares. These are natural and unavoidable consequences of war. The civil structure of commercial cooperation can be restored only with difficulty and after a considerable lapse of time.

But the notion of a boycott of Germany after the war has been entertained by statesmen as well as by private persons suffering under German outrage and by traders hoping for restraints upon future German competition. It is as a matter of national policy that the German boycott is to be judged. Moreover, it is to be judged from the point of view of victory over Germany, not from the point of view of defeat. Those who believe that Germany will win and establish herself in a position to dominate the world might be justified in taking refuge in the idea of a boycott. Thereby brute force might be shorn of part of the fruits of victory. But nowhere is there any sign of Allied yielding. The most desperate efforts of Germany, by land and by sea, are failing of their objectives, and Allied strength is waxing, German strength waning. What we have to consider, then, is the application of a boycott to a defeated Germany. What ends shall we achieve by the boycott that we cannot better achieve by other means?

What victory can profitably achieve is to drive Germany back within her proper national boundaries and to compel her to make reparation for the injuries she has wrought in acknowledged violation of the law of nations. This will mean for the German government one of the most colossal defeats in history. From her dream of world empire she will have been thrown back upon herself, bound hand and foot in her own debt, her industries crippled, her manhood decimated. Such will be the immediate effect of Allied victory. But there are ulterior effects to be taken into account that have an important bearing upon the future peace of the world. Military autocracy thrives upon victory; under defeat, unaccompanied by menace from abroad, it is discredited among the people upon whose docility it depends. The German rulers will have to meet conditions quite different from those of the period after 1870 when their subjects have had time for bitter reflection upon the costs heaped upon them by a policy of military adventure. For the sake of the future peace of the world, Allied policy ought to aim at exposing to the full light of day exactly what these costs amount to. Will a boycott of Germany, enforcing a continuance of her economic isolation, subserve this purpose?

After the war the German population will expect full rations and adequate supplies of the raw materials essential to the resumption of employ-

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ment. This would involve heavy importation. But how will Germany pay for imported food and materials? The war has exhausted her stocks of goods, and her current production is already mortgaged to the replacement of machinery and equipment worn out by war. The extirpation of her selling agencies in the greater part of the world deprives her of a ready market for the special products that do not draw heavily upon imported materials, and the rise of competing industries, as in the case of chemicals and dyes, closes the market for other special products. She cannot afford to part with her small stock of gold, impounded in her banks as a tenuous security for her huge paper circulation. She cannot float public loans abroad, since her credit is already strained past recovery. The private credit of her business men will hardly be a favorite investment abroad, since there is no one who does not anticipate a great financial crash in Germany following upon the relaxation of military administration. However generously the Allied governments may proceed in the matter of commerce with Germany, the trade of Germany can reestablish itself only after a succession of painful crises calculated to bring home to every German solid if desolate conclusions on the economics of military adventure. To the actual hardship that the Germans must endure a boycott would contribute little.

But a boycott would serve for the German government as an excellent cloak for the effects of its misdeeds and mistakes. Germany will want Australian wool and wheat; American cotton and corn and meat; copper and rubber, phosphates and nitrates from territories under control of the Allied combination. She will want them and cannot pay for them, because of her own reckless war waste. If, however, we will do the German government the favor of denying these supplies to Germany absolutely, it can shift the blame for scarcity and dearth from its own incompetence to Allied animosity. The German government can make a bond of union between itself and its people out of a condition that would otherwise deprive it of the popular confidence by which it lives.

Whatever our attitude must be toward the German people, who have permitted themselves to be used as instruments in the aggressive designs of their government, we shall find no difficulty in agreeing that the German governmental system itself is the arch-enemy. In our military policy we are bending every effort to discredit the system in the eyes of the German people themselves. The German government itself shakes under defeat, attenuated though the force of the blow must be in passing through a million breasts of men who truly did not will this war. There is no medium through which " the war after the war " can strike home to the Kaiser and the German General Staff. They will not go about short of food and inadequately clad. They will lack nothing though Germany becomes a hermit empire. What they will gain is a general sentiment of animosity toward the world that will make a forlorn virtue out of even a lost war.

But it may be said, a boycott of Germany effective enough to isolate her economically would prevent her from accumulating wealth to serve the purposes of a later war. A nation does not need to accumulate wealth through trade in order to be a danger to its neighbors. Germany can maintain out of her own resources enough fighting men to put to the test the strength of the remaining European Powers. Out of her own resources she can munition them and supply them with guns. This she is proving today. She needs only to reconcile her people to a life of grinding labor and poverty, to remain a terrible menace to Europe unless her heart changes. Hard-trained Junkers are even now extolling the new type of German, stripped of all wants and all flesh not serviceable for war. They are praying that the type may be perpetuated in peace. An Allied boycott would help to grant them their prayer. It would aid the Junkers in building up in Germany a form of life with nothing to lose and much to gain through war.

It is our obvious policy to carry on the actual war until we have won all the desirable objects that can be attained by war, and to dismiss from contemplation measures of " war after the war " appropriate to defeated nations, not to nations that intend to be victors. This does not mean that we must return to the more or less negligent commercial conceptions that prevailed before the war. We may find it to our national interest to restrict the operation upon our soil of commercial agencies that lend themselves to " peaceful penetration." We may find it desirable, at least in the period of reconstruction, to assure ourselves that pressing domestic needs are supplied before we permit heavy withdrawals for export of vital necessaries. We may seek to assure our continued independence of foreign sources of supply in the case of commodities holding key positions in industry. These are points that are debatable in terms of the national interest alone. What measures we may decide to be conducive to our own national welfare, let us by all means apply, with resolution. But let us avoid all appearance of a policy whose purpose, even incidentally, is to wreak injury upon another nation with which we are formally living on terms of peace. Such a policy, if directed against Germany, would merely play into the hands of the German government and postpone its day of retribution.

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Trade Unions and Productive Efficiency

IF the trade unions had not existed, the government would have had to create them for the effective industrial prosecution of the war. When the cantonments were planned the War Department turned to the unions for help in the swift mobilization of skilled men and in keeping them steadily at work. When the history of these improvised cities comes to be written, it will be recognized that the surprising speed of their construction was made possible by the cooperation of the trade unions. Last winter, when the car shortage choked the coal mines, the fuel administration turned to the officers of the United Mine Workers to save the coal regions from industrial chaos. Government agents have found it necessary to promote the trade union organization of the stock yard workers in order to safeguard our meat supply. Officers of the Brotherhoods have been taken into the federal railroad administration. In order to make its vast shipbuilding programme possible of realization, the government through the Navy and the Emergency Fleet Corporation entered into a direct collective agreement with the international metal trades unions, under which the representative Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board was created. From an embryonic industry, shipbuilding has grown over night until the yards now employ in the neighborhood of two hundred and fifty thousand men. There have been no strikes of consequence in the shipyards. Even in such departments as the Ordnance Bureau, where no representative labor adjustment boards have as yet been set up, the production executives have had to lean heavily upon the trade union officials to steady production in unorganized as well as in organized shops. Notwithstanding much inaccurate and prejudiced publicity to the contrary, and the disingenuous criticism of such employers' associations as those composing the National Industrial Conference Board, the trade unions have been indispensable pivots upon which our industrial mobilization and expansion have turned.

In face of such facts, it is noteworthy that no positive creative functions have been assigned to the trade unions. Even in the shipyards, which have been organized under an explicit collective agreement between the government and the unions, the sole use to which the national leaders have been put has been to quiet unrest and keep the men at work. They have participated in the hearings before the Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board which has established standards of hours and pay, but they have neither been entrusted with the recruiting of skilled men, for which they are so obviously equipped, nor with the equally important duty, for which also they should be peculiarly well qualified, of determining reasonable standards of efficient production. They have been criticized for retarding production when they have had no explicitly recognized part in the selection of shipyard workers and when no standards existed by which to measure productive efficiency.

The case of the riveters has been exploited in the press. Many statements have been published purporting to show that union limitations on output were primarily responsible for the alleged falling off in the riveters' output in the new yards as compared with the recognized standards in the yards that were doing business before the war. This charge was so persistently headlined that it was made the subject of public inquiry by a Committee of the United States Senate. Mr. Gompers went before this Committee in defense of the unions and explained that in severely cold weather such as had prevailed in the east last winter, "pneumatic tools for riveting are capable of performing less than fifty per cent of the normal work." Mr. Franklin, of the Boiler Makers' Union, testifying before the same Committee said: "One of the chief causes for what might appear to be a lack of efficiency, or falling-off in output, is due to several other reasons—failure to get materials, failure of what are known as the shop men, the men who get the material out, to have it prepared and ready for men who are constructing the hull; inefficient tools, worn out tools; hundreds of cases of men placed in supervisory positions over the men, who have never had any previous experience, who are without any shipyard experience."

Plausible as such explanations sounded, they were not wholly convincing. And they were not convincing, because no scientifically determined standards by which the efficiency of riveters might have been dispassionately judged, had ever been established. Moreover, the unions have had to admit that in order to protect their members from ruinous competition, exploitation and the ever present menace of unemployment under the conditions of industrial anarchy that prevailed before the intervention of the government, they had actually placed limitations on output not only upon the riveters under their jurisdiction, but also upon the caulkers, shipwrights and skilled men of other trades.

Under ordinary peace conditions, such limitations were essential to the stability and very existence of the unions. As one of the wisest and most sympathetic students of trade unionism, the late Professor Robert F. Hoxie, has said: "The workers have been taught by long experience that the average employer is constantly seeking to take

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advantage of the support of public opinion, arbitrators, the police and the courts to secure an increase of the output and at the same time to lessen the shares and the amount of the product going to the workers." But the present excess of demand over the supply of skilled men, coupled with the existence of such democratically constituted governmental agencies as the Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board, has radically modified and abated the evils of the old industrial anarchy. Through such agencies, the men are securing standard wage rates on a national scale, standard hours, standard payment for overtime, security against discrimination, against exploitation through the introduction of labor-saving devices, guaranties that wage rates will be increased in conformity with the rising cost of living. In view of these new safeguards, the unions have begun to lift their customary limitations on output.

But having made this concession, they will be inviting demoralization and chaos now and especially after the war, unless they solicit and are accorded positive functions in the determination of socially sound standards of production—not standards that individual and exceptional workers can attain at a sprint, but standards that all competent workers may reasonably be expected to maintain without jeopardizing their health day in and day out over sustained periods. Already "bell-horses" and "swifts"—hare-brained speed-up men—are being encouraged by the childish and short-sighted inter-yard competitions that have been encouraged by certain amateurs employed by the Fleet Corporation, in an apparent effort to cover up the managerial inefficiencies of the corporation. This is one of the by-products of so-called scientific management of which, with good reason, the unions have been leery.

But, while hotly decrying scientific management of the speed-up, profiteering variety, the unions have stoutly asserted their approval of science in management as contrasted with the muddled consequences of the traditionally secretive apprentice system. Today, they have an unprecedented opportunity to prove this assertion and by so doing to overcome one of the most deeply rooted of public prejudices against them by applying the methods of scientific job analysis under democratic supervision to the processes such as riveting around which the charges of slacking have centred. There are places in the cramped hold of a ship where it is said that even highly skilled men cannot fasten more than fifty rivets a day. There are other open places where riveters with their normal crew of helpers have been able to clench more than a thousand rivets a day. What is a reasonable day's work for a riveter? It is said that the steady handling of pneumatic riveting machines contracts the effective life of riveters into the tragically short span of from five to seven years. Many of the riveters who have come before the Shipbuilding Wage Adjustment Board have been deaf as a result of a few years at their trade. Today, no one knows what a fair day's work for a competent riveter is. It is all a matter of opinion, of countercharges of slacking and managerial inefficiency.

The country does not demand the pace that kills; but it does most urgently want the highest reasonable speed. Today, the unions stand between the accusation of slacking on the one hand and the menace of the "swifts" and "bell-horses" on the other—between public disfavor and establishment of killing standards that may outlast the war. For the first time in our industrial history, the unions have an opportunity to apply science to production under democratic auspices and with the assurance that the benefits of improved processes and methods will accrue to the nation and not to selfish profiteers.

As a matter of sound strategy as well as for reasons of patriotism, is this not the time for the unions to take the initiative in promoting, especially in such government departments as the Fleet Corporation, the organization of committees, composed of technical experts designated by the Corporation, by the managements of the shipyards, and by the unions from their own ranks, to study in full scientific detail those processes regarding which there is controversy involving charges of inefficiency or slacking; to examine into all possible improvements and economies of process, machinery and method with a view to securing the universal adoption of the best; and to apply such devices in such ways as to secure labor's unreserved cooperation and the protection of its rights?

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Union Behind the Lines

The Red Cross

GENERAL PERSHING'S simple words to General Foch at the end of the first crisis of the great battle have deeply moved all Americans in France; the coordination, the cooperation of the disciplined military forces is to be complete; in the next few weeks and months we shall see our stripling army leaping into the combat with a French and British hand on either shoulder. How shall we, who are privileged to be in France, convey to those at home our belief in the fundamental virtue of this alliance? By telling them what we have already seen with our eyes, heard with our ears, felt with our hearts, during the preliminary crisis. The fusion of America with the French and British effort took place by spontaneous combustion behind the lines the very hour the German offensive began, through the medium of the American Red Cross.

Day by day as the enemy's attack pushed the Allied armies back and, step by step, ahead of them, the French civilian population—most of whom had been restored for only a few months to their native villages—Americans contributed both to soldiers and civilians the sort of material assistance, the sort of elemental sympathy and fraternity that grow into a positive constructive spiritual force. Like a great snow-fall of faith and understanding this force, that neutralized and denied the potency of mere destructive might, rolled before the bloody engine that ground behind. During the process the Franco-American bond, in particular, was strengthened to a degree that nobody but the population of the devastated areas, and the American men and women who lived with them through this hard pioneer winter of reconstruction, will ever quite know. Together they renounced precious hopes, and forged new ones on the bitter pilgrimage. It was not humanly in the power of America to help avert the initial disaster, but the organized social and medical resources of the American Red Cross, aided by its excellent mechanism of transportation, were able to help the French government and the gallant French and British armies transform what might have been a rout into an orderly evacuation.

The Red Cross in France has fallen naturally into two great divisions: "Military Affairs," cooperating primarily with the army, filling surgical needs such as the manufacture of dressings, splints, anesthetics, providing doctors and nurses, running railroad canteens and infirmaries; making a scientific study of army ills, like wounds and trench fever; and "Civilian Affairs" occupying itself exclusively with the French civilian population through bureaus for children, for the tuberculous, for refugees, for reconstruction and the like. On the day of the German offensive, the High Commissioner for France, called all the operating heads of both branches together, and said in effect: "Here is a supreme emergency; if we are a union in the American sense, we are one today." And they have proved it.

The story of the providing would fill a highly dramatic volume. Chauffeurs who all day evacuated civilians and hospitals and transported couriers under fire were at night called upon to become doctors' aids—even grave-diggers. A mere publicity man was straightway transformed into an ambulance driver, a canteener, a herder of goats and cows, an evacuator of Old Ladies' Homes. One women's hospital unit, which saw its French hospital burned behind it, and was pursued by a Boche plane all the way to comparative safety, returned next day to help four American doctors run a hospital which they had refused to leave when it was ordered evacuated by the British army—a hospital where desperately wounded, including a number of Americans, were cared for, while French batteries all about it barked and roared, and a Red Cross construction engineer (who had been rebuilding farther north) stood by with a torch always ready for lighting. A member of a devoted college reconstruction unit, which had also seen its "Mairie-Ecole" go up in smoke, was able to put to use knowledge of the roads, acquired through a hard winter of snow and cold, by directing military traffic at a cross roads during three crucial hours. Another member of the same unit took up a similar position in a sentry box. Everybody—including the directing minds—had to be everything and everywhere. Yet chaos did not reign, and two points seem to stand out in relation to the Red Cross work: first the fusion into intense cooperative utility of many previously separate bureaus; second the unification of control that gradually took place in the field not only over separate Red Cross bureaus but over societies and units supported by the Red Cross, but not previously under its direction. If names are to be given Major Edward Eyre Hunt, director of the Bureau of Reconstruction and Relief, earlier in the war an aid to Herbert Hoover on the Belgian Relief Commission, stands out as having carried out his special job of helping in the evacuation of the civilian population during the crisis with remarkable swiftness and efficiency.

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Much credit is due to all the workers, who proved themselves entirely oblivious both to danger and to fatigue.

The late liberated region was divided last autumn, from the standpoint of this Bureau, into regional divisions, each with at least one Red Cross delegate in the field—with transportation and a warehouse at his disposal—to cooperate for reconstruction with all local agencies, governmental, military and private. The French policy has been to repopulate slowly and carefully with the original inhabitants the region freed by the German retreat of March 1917, many of whom were already concentrated in the neighborhood of Noyon and other such towns, to bring back the land to cultivation, and provide temporary shelter pending permanent rebuilding. Prefects and sub-prefects and mayors or their "remplaçants," if the original men were prisoners in Germany, have worked untiringly with the French military authorities, the government bureaus, especially the Ministry of Agriculture, the leaders of the cooperative movement, the heads of relief societies, French, English and American, to accomplish this end. In the zone towards the Channel controlled by the British where a different policy prevailed, there has been less activity than in the Somme, Aisne and Oise, but there too the Red Cross delegates have been able to fulfill an invaluable diplomatic and practical function. Throughout the whole liberated area the delegate has been everybody's friend, everybody's helper, studying local conditions, reporting to Paris on special needs and thence receiving supplies.

The French authorities have always been friendly if not cordial, so have the French societies, so a thousand times have the civilians. But when the offensive began, and the problem of immediate motor transport and immediate food reserves became vital, the Red Cross sprang into a new significance. To supplement the necessarily limited resources of the reconstruction bureaus the warehouses and motors and trucks of the military affairs department could be drawn on. Indeed almost all civilian mobile transportation facilities were in the hands of the Red Cross or in those of its dependent American societies; and the delegates with their burning desire to help were on the spot.

On Friday, March 22nd, the Red Cross reconstruction transport and personnel—not of course a large body—extended in a line running almost directly north and south whose fixed points were as follows: Arras, Péronne, Ham, Noyon, Blérancourt, Soissons. On Saturday the Arras representative had reached Amiens, the Ham representative was in Nesle, the rest remaining the same. On Sunday the line became Amiens, Montdidier, Lassigny, Noyon, Blérancourt, Soissons. On Monday that line also went to pieces, and on Tuesday morning the following line, which still holds and running practically east and west was established; Onen, Beauvais, Clermont, Compiègne, Vic, Aisne, Soissons. The delegate at Arras made three moves, the delegate in Ham two, the delegate in Noyon one, while the Soissons delegate has up to now made none. The Arras warehouse had a small stock which was left in the hands of the British and is as yet untaken. Ham had also a small stock left to the British. British soldiers burned the American construction camp at Croix-Molignaux, centre of rebuilding for five villages. At Nesle, the two barrack warehouses were burnt after their stock had been distributed to the Tommies. On Sunday supplies were transported from Noyon to Lassigny to provide a "cache" for British soldiers in the "Village Reconstitué" of blessed memory. Much was given out in Noyon, but part of the Noyon stock had to be abandoned. The biggest stock, 200,000 francs worth, was at Soissons. This has been moved steadily east and west to aid both soldiers and civilians.

Major Hunt established a courier service from one end to the other of his strategic line. He himself patrolled it nearly every day from end to end, following the retreat of every society and village, carrying out instructions and requests from British and French military and French civilian authorities, and aiding the units to supply food to peasants and soldiers along the way. His private difficulty was to make his personnel "stay put"—everybody's idea was not to avoid shells but to get into the thick of them. The congested condition of the roads was inconceivable. Fair weather prevailed, but the military movement stirred a cloud of fine white dust which clung to everything, and made the trees stand out like spectres. It might take a truck three hours to go three kilometers. Troops of all nations,—British, French and colonial predominating, heavy artillery, camions, were flowing in both directions. Wounded soldiers were being evacuated in trucks filled with straw. Tractor plows were inching their way out. Chinese laborers, who had been road-building for the British, were running, running, with their little packages bobbing on their backs.

Then came the civilians: they too like the army saved personnel—that is their families and such transport as were savable: wheel barrows, baby carriages, farm carts. The American Red Cross cars and trucks rushed up from Paris and acted as jitneys and land ferries where possible; so did the French ammunition trucks which picked up whole villages as they went back empty from the front. The Friends' Unit, which backed out, helped push the wheelbarrows. The population drove before

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it cows and goats just acquired from some kind society; not a rabbit or a kitten or a dog was abandoned, and certainly not the fine new blankets and clothes which were rolled into enormous bundles. The thing that grieved the Frenchwomen most was to leave the " beautiful stoves " and cupboards given them by the Americans, which were positively not transportable. Often they would not separate, at the final station where they boarded the train, from the women from overseas who had helped them through the winter without explicit promises that they would come back with them " next time." Addresses were exchanged. One young Quaker accompanied his village all the way to Brittany without a passport—and was arrested for doing it—because he could not bear to let them go without him. No complaints were heard. A fine passive patience prevailed. A few women cried quietly, but the morale was on the whole stupendous.

The French authorities, be it clearly understood, always had these civilians in most orderly and sympathetic charge. Trains were, of course, provided to evacuate them from the war zone. If they had relatives in other parts of France they might go to them; otherwise provincial destinations were given them. A great part of them passed through Paris, and there again the American Red Cross gave a helping hand wherever it could, with supplies, lodging, motor transport, teams of nurses; the personnel from all the bureaus volunteered to work in shifts at the stations. Dr. Devine's bureau for refugees and repatriates rendered invaluable assistance, and is now helping, through regional delegates very much like those of the other bureau, but scattered through the " zone of the interior," to settle the convoys in the provinces, and meet their essential needs. It has come to seem perfectly natural to a family which has been fed by the Americans in occupied France, and assisted by them in liberated France, to be met by them again in some remote spot in the Pyrenees.

The question that emerges from the second exodus is obvious: Was reconstruction in liberated France a mistake? Many military experts will certainly incline to this view. The overwhelming opinion, here and now among those who shared the experience is all the other way. Even those French soldiers whose hearts were most wrung as they marched towards the battle, by the sight of exquisite farms which had just begun to show the fruit of early spring labors were glad they had been brought back to life. It is said that the British cavalry in its retreat never once trampled over the newly plowed and planted land. As for the reconstructionists, with a mighty voice they declare that they are ready to begin again. Their losses have been comparable to military losses in guns and material. These were a thousand times compensated, they declare, by the aid they were able to render the military themselves, through a field organization of such magnitude and most of all by the coordination of French and American hearts and purposes that has grown out of the union behind the lines. When the Red Cross delegate in one region fell back to his second post and was again ordered to retreat, he went to see his friend the sous-préfet and offer him transportation. The latter refused; he said he had decided to be taken with his town. " All right," said the Red Cross delegate cheerfully, " I'll stay with you," and he sat down. Upon which the sous-préfet burst into tears, kissed him on both cheeks, and consented to get into the motor.

The Red Cross itself wants no praise. Both its leaders and its workers are filled only with an overwhelming sense of their debt to France, who in Picardy, as at Verdun, has offered her bare breast to save their cause. But it is right that those across the Atlantic should know that their Red Cross representatives in France have been worthy of a great mission.

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT

Paris, April 6th.

The German Offensive

TAUGHT by the experience of eighteen months, the Allies in France had determined to postpone their offensive until such time as they had received sufficient American reinforcements to restore their superiority in numbers. In other words the military calculations set forth recently in these columns under the title 1918 and 1919 were the accepted military policy of the western Allies. But if the Allies had reasons for preferring 1919 there were also good reasons why the Germans should prefer 1918: hence the present offensive. It is an attempt to finish the war in the west on land before the Americans can put their military power in France. This attempt was expected and, according to Mr. Lloyd George, both the numbers of the enemy and the point at which he would attack were forecasted by Sir H. Wilson, the new Chief of Staff, as long ago as January. By all the experience of the war this attack would meet with some measure of success. We probably expected to be pushed back from five to ten miles and if that had been all we should have been justified in regarding ourselves as unequivocally the victors. In fact the Germans did very much better than we expected, though not so well as they expected. The British attacks in 1916 and 1917 had shown that no position was im-

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pregnable and that given local superiority in numbers of men and of guns it was always possible to indent any line however strong to a distance of four or five miles. The British did that over and over again in 1917. The problem that remained to be solved, and which the British attacks have conspicuously failed to solve, was to make the indentation so wide as to neutralize the effect of enfilading fire and to follow up the initial success with sufficient rapidity. It was a problem requiring for its solution not genius but patient elaboration of detail and perfect staff work.

While an advance of three or four miles could be predicted with mathematical certainty, an advance of more than that would imply some failure in the Allied system of command. This failure undoubtedly took place, though too little is known of the details of the battle to enable us to indicate it with precision. But the measures taken by the Allied governments show quite clearly where they thought the screws were loose. The worst and earliest failure was in the fifth British army south of St. Quentin and its commander General Gough has been brought home. Clearly the government must have had reason to doubt his capacity though no specific mistakes have yet been alleged against him. It was on his section that the numerical superiority of the Germans was at its greatest, and the best general in the world cannot hold up against odds so heavy as those against him. The second measure was the appointment of General Foch to command the Allied manoeuvres of defense. Everybody thought that this very necessary reform had already been made as the result of the Versailles Conference. What else could be the meaning of all the mysterious whisperings about the new army of manoeuvre and of the somewhat ill conditioned protests against the idea of British troops being put under French command? But whatever was decided nothing was in fact done. There was no real unity of command. The reserves were slow in arriving, they were brought up in driblets, and at no time, at any rate the first week, was the shock of a fresh army organized for that very purpose opposed to the German advance. Although the gross numbers of the German and Allied armies in France were approximately equal and although we had the better air service and the attack was expected just where it came, it is clear that the arrangements to meet it were inadequate and badly organized. The third measure taken by the British government, namely the publication of an army order prescribing that promotion to the rank of full general should no longer be by seniority, is also significant as showing what was in the mind of the government.

At the end of a fortnight the impetus of the German advance had been exhausted. The point of the attack had been deflected from the valley of the Oise towards Amiens. The Allied line was badly bulged, and an enormous amount of stores and valuable territory had been lost, but lines are not rigid but elastic and so long as the two ends held the Allied reverses did not amount to a strategic defeat. Indeed, unless they could widen their front of attack again, the Germans had some cause for uneasiness about the safety of their own flanks. Their position was becoming dangerously like that just before the battle of the Marne, with this difference, that whereas then the threat to their flanks was on one wing only now it is on two. A new point of attack therefore became necessary for them and at the time of writing it looks as though they had selected the region between La Bassée and Armentières for their new thrust. The reasons for this movement are obvious. They want to loosen the northern pin at Arras to which the elastic band of the Allied line is holding fast. They further hope that up at this northern end they may find defective arrangements for the concentration of reserves similar to those which gave them their successes south of St. Quentin; and, further, the coast is nearer at this end of the line both to the front and to the coast of England.

Reforms in organization take time before they become effective and in the meanwhile numbers have to make good faulty strategic arrangements. Except by the few the promptness with which Mr. Wilson offered American troops to supply the gaps in English and French divisions has not been estimated at its true value. It is in splendid contrast to the particularist squabbles which have delayed the execution of the Versailles reforms. It is no small sacrifice of national pride that Mr. Wilson has made to the Allied cause. It is natural that a great nation like America, taking what we all hope will be the decisive part in the defeat of Germany, should wish to have its own army in France organized in its own divisions and under separate divisional commands. More than once the British army, especially in the early stages, has been sandwiched between French troops but it never even temporarily lost its own individuality or passed from under the command of its own divisional staffs. And every soldier knows how much that means from the professional point of view. In waiving all these points the United States has performed a great act of loyalty which is deeply appreciated by those who know how much it means, and it will later make a fund of popular gratitude in England.

The English government seems to have felt that although there was very little flesh left on the bones of the state after raising 6,000,000 men for the

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army and navy since the beginning of the war, it was its duty at any rate to show willingness to train off what little was left. Hence the Man Power bill which in spite of opposition will have passed into law by the time these lines are read. To its proposals, especially to the proposal for conscription in Ireland, the same objection applies. They will not be really operative until the crisis is past, and in the meantime they will probably do great political mischief. It is important that the American people should understand the grounds of the opposition to the new bill. There is nowhere any claim that the lives of men between forty and fifty should be sacrosanct from the operations of war; on the contrary the law of nature is that the old should die first and that the young who at any rate in normal times have so much more both to give and to receive from life should be preserved. The argument for or against is purely one of expediency.

It is said, and with good reason, that men from forty to fifty will at once be the most expensive and the least efficient of soldiers. They carry the burden of the business of the country, they contribute most heavily in taxation, they may have already contributed from their families. Moreover, as it is hard to teach an old dog new tricks they will be slow to learn the business of war. The proportion of effectives amongst them will be small, they will release for service much fewer than their own numbers of young men, and lastly, when the war is over, they will find it much more difficult than the young men to make a fresh start in life. These and these only are the grounds of opposition. In Ireland too the grounds of opposition are mainly based on expediency. Ireland, through the Nationalist party in Parliament, gave its whole-hearted support to the war, and with men of fifty liable to service in England it is difficult to maintain on the grounds of equity the exemption of Ireland from conscription. But the practical objections are very serious. Owing very largely to the tactless handling of Ireland by the War Office the war is unpopular and it is in the highest degree probable that the attempt to impose conscription on the country will be resisted by force.

Estimates differ as to the number of men this conscription will bring in from Ireland. A large part of the population is engaged in agriculture, and in the north in ship building, the most essential of all our industries. Probably too the percentage of physically unfit will be exceptionally high. It is to be hoped that even now these objections may prevail with the government, but the chances are not good. An appeal from Mr. Wilson, who is probably President of as many Irishmen as George V is king, might do great good, if only some way could be found for making it with perfect correctness.

H. SIDEBOTHAM

London

Austria's Pacifism

WHEN M. Clemenceau gave to the world the startling letter in which the Austrian Emperor proposed terms of peace to France, he marked the end of a chapter. The publication of the letter would have been an unpardonable imprudence if the Emperor Karl were still an effective force working for a peace of reconciliation. Without a facsimile of the letter in the original language, it is hard to form a judgment upon it: and even then its terms might admit of two interpretations. At the lowest, it meant that Austria was very much more anxious for peace than her ally, and was ready to discuss terms which included large concessions, more especially from her ally. For a year past by every device of private suggestion and public advocacy, she has endeavored to hasten peace, even at the cost of incurring the violent hostility of the German military party. The exposure of her efforts to attain peace must now have drawn down upon her the violent anger and suspicion of the Junkers. Flushed with the double elation of their easy triumphs in the east and their costly successes on the western front, dreaming once more of annexations and indemnities, they will turn upon this monarch as a false ally, and bury under their imprecations not him alone, but the whole Catholic pacifist movement of which he was the spokesman. Their fury may make for the young Emperor one of the most painful humiliations through which the Hapsburg dynasty has passed in our time. M. Clemenceau reasoned that it is to our advantage, even by means which challenge criticism, to create distrust and disunion in the enemy camp. There is one grave drawback to these tactics. After this sharp lesson, will the Emperor again dare to promote the cause of an early peace? If he were to risk another effort, can any vestige of influence among the leaders of opinion of the Central Powers survive this disclosure? Has not M. Clemenceau silenced a voice which was pleading for peace, and made an enemy of a man who wished to be a friend?

The French Ministry must have assumed that for some time to come the Austrian passion for

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peace has been submerged by events. The Emperor wrote before the collapse of Russia, before the successful offensive against Italy, before the treachery of the Ukrainian Rada, before the painful surrender of Rumania, and before the second battle of the Somme. A good deal has happened to prove that the Austrian peace party, even though the Emperor still heads it, is not its own master. It had to acquiesce in the cruel eastern treaties. A day after the civilian ministers had declared that no Austrian troops would take part in the last invasion of Russian soil, the military command set them in motion. A few weeks after Count Czernin had vowed that he would not take a yard of Russian territory, the Magyars forced him to assent to what is no less a violation of his professed principles—the "strategic rectifications" at the expense of Rumania. Finally, when Count Czernin in public speeches doubly underlined his solidarity with Germany in the question of Alsace, he declared, in a sort of cipher which the French government would understand, that the Emperor's recognition of the justice of French claims (if he ever made it) is now a thing of the past. M. Clemenceau had some reason to dismiss Austrian pacifism as a negligible factor. Sincere it may be, with the sincerity of desperation, passionate it may be, with all the resentment of a helpless victim toward an overbearing master, but it is powerless. It cannot act for itself. It cannot influence its ally. The conclusion of this reasoning was evidently that the only use which can be made of Austrian pacifism is to expose its rather pitiful manoeuvres, in order to sap the cohesion of the hostile alliance.

It was after the Russian Revolution that Austrian pacifism openly declared itself from high places. The connection of these two events was not accidental. The Revolution meant the end of pan-Slavism. The dread of that aggressive, disintegrating movement was suddenly lifted from the mind of Austria's rulers, and they realized their liberation from the fear which had made them Germany's allies, if not her vassals. They had tolerated Prussian militarism because they found it useful; it was the foil to the ambitions of Tsardom in Galicia and the Balkans. There was, however, another reason why the Russian Revolution caused Austria to sigh more than ever for peace. In the fate of Russia she saw an anticipation of her own destiny. After the first beginnings of the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905, the Emperor Francis Joseph conceded manhood suffrage to Austria. After the successful Russian Revolution of 1917, the Emperor Karl talked of "Democracy," proclaimed the ideal of an Austria composed of "equally privileged nationalities," furthered franchise reform in Hungary, and tried to conciliate the Czechs.

In the long run, the working out of the parallel between Austria and Russia is a question only of time. The ultimate factor in this war, as in any protracted modern war, is economic endurance. The collapse of Russia had its local and temperamental features which cannot be reproduced elsewhere. Ultimately, it meant that a backward agricultural nation cannot survive a long war of attrition on the present scale. There were picturesque aggravations of Russia's case—her Rasputin, her Empress, her tendency to theoretical extremes. What really counted in the balance was the attrition of her means of transport, the wearing-out of her rails, her locomotives, her wagons, the dearth of the simplest agricultural implements, the massacre of her horses, and paralysis of a primitive industry which could no longer supply even the spades and the horse-shoes which she required. She could not import, she could not produce. She collapsed, partly because her organization was primitive, and partly because her bureaucracy was too stupid, too disloyal, too distrustful to improvize an efficient, popular substitute for itself.

In a less degree, Austria presented the same features. She, too, is primarily an agricultural nation. Her organization also is relatively primitive, and her peasantry relatively medieval in mind. Her rhythm of work is slow and easy-going. Even her agriculture (to say nothing of her industry) as Herr Naumann puts it, is in Austria twenty, and in Hungary forty years behind that of Germany. Like Russia, she exports food in normal times. Like Russia, she has come near starvation in time of war. If her bureaucracy was much less corrupt and much less stupid than that of Russia, it also has shrunk from the test of fostering a popular substitute for itself. There is a limit to the endurance of every state engaged in this war. The Russian limit was three years. There is some absolute figure which measures Austrian endurance. It may be four years; a little less or a little more; it may be five. It is not indefinitely elastic, because the Austrian mechanism shows in a much less degree the same fatal incapacity as the Russian: it cannot replace its own worn-out parts.

Most of us realize today that the period of Russia's endurance was shortened because the Entente turned a deaf ear to her pleading, and refused to revise its war aims. The same symptoms are evident within the Central Alliance. Since the Emperor Karl first came to the throne and cleared the ministries of the men who made the war, Austria has stood within the central group, as Russia stood within the Entente, for a moderate pro-

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gramme, a status quo settlement of territorial questions, and the reconstruction of European society on the basis of disarmament, and arbitration. Like Russia, she renounced all conquests for herself, and even now the re-drawing of the Rumanian frontier on which Hungary has insisted, though bad in principle, is trivial in extent.

War-weariness always seeks a theoretical disguise, which may, none the less, be sincere. When the Russian Revolution in its early stages renounced the dream of Constantinople, called for the abandonment of all imperialism, and began to evolve the simple, but far-reaching philosophy of self-determination, it saw before it the limit of its active participation in the war. Stripped of academic refinements, its policy was a call for the dropping of all war aims which might prolong the war. Official Austria has adopted a more conservative philosophy, the Catholic pacifism of the Papal Note. It is luke-warm and uncertain about the democratic theory of self-determination. It looks further into the future than the Russians did, and lays stress (as they did not) on disarmament, partly perhaps as a means of lessening its own dependence on the Prussian war machine, but chiefly because it dreads the prospect of bankruptcy. He would be a blind cynic who doubted the sincerity of the Emperor's pacifism; there are phrases in all his public declarations which could have been coined only by a mind which had reached its position by its own mental travail. None the less, the brutal fact is very simple, and it does not differ from the Russian fact. Austria renounces conquests for herself, and calls on her allies as loudly as she dares, to renounce them also, primarily because she knows that she cannot stagger without permanent ruin through an indefinitely prolonged war.

Count Czernin pleaded, as Kerenski pleaded, for moderation, because Austria, like Russia, is very nearly worn out. His fate has been the same. He has not moved his allies. He has had to acquiesce, though with no direct profit to Austria, in the cruel eastern peace. On the eve of his fall he stood helpless before the consequences of his failure—the ascendancy of the German war lords, the inevitable refusal of the western Powers to make peace on the basis of German domination, the renewal of the offensive in the west and the prolongation of the war, which he had desperately tried to shorten. He has fallen, as Kerenski fell, in the hopeless effort at once to secure a moderate peace and to please his own allies.

Up to this point, the parallel between the cases of Austria and Russia is close. Is it destined to be closer yet? There are unluckily sharp differences as well as likenesses. Germany exerts over her ally a power which Great Britain and France did not possess over Russia. There is, moreover, in the Magyar and German governing classes of the Dual Monarchy an element which responds to Berlin far more promptly than any element in Russia responded to London or Paris. The Emperor may seek to explain or repudiate his compromising letter; Count Czernin may rally in public speeches to the defense of Alsace, and resign when complications overwhelm him. None the less, the economic reasons which drive Austria imperatively to an early peace, are still operative. Count Czernin's anxiety was very legible in his last speech. He seems to dread not so much a mass movement for peace on the part of the working class, which may repeat the general strike of January, as the refusal of the Slavs to be reconciled, and to take part in any reorganization and consolidation of the monarchy.

The Czechs in particular have played a part which exactly reproduces the tactics of Sinn Fein in Ireland. They want no settlement arranged at Vienna: they cling doggedly to the hope of a settlement dictated by the Peace Conference. In Russia, all the masses wanted an early peace. In Austria the Slav politicians, and still more the Slav exiles, are driven by the logic of their maximum demands to desire a prolongation of the war, since at no less a price can they hope for a settlement dictated by the Entente. There was in Russia no such fundamental division of opinion. The Emperor may have behind him the mass of the German working-class of Austria, but he cannot reckon, for all his liberalism and his desire for reconciliation, on the support of his Slavs. Even if he were to break finally with the German and Magyar parties of ascendancy, he has no assurance that he would gain the Czechs, or even the Poles and the South Slavs. While the war lasts, he is condemned by these internal divisions to impotence. Nothing less than the conviction that a forcible settlement of internal questions is excluded will bring the Slavs to compromise. Austria can take no decided action on her own initiative; yet she knows that the failure to act may be her ruin. The refusal of the Entente to consider the needs of Russia led to her collapse and disintegration. The refusal of Germany to consider the needs of Austria may have consequences even more disastrous to her. Her influence will not count again among the Central Powers until Germany experiences another period of war-weariness, more acute than that of last summer. Passive, hopeless and hunger-driven, in what condition will Austria emerge from the ordeal?

H. N. BRAILSFORD

London

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Cannon—Whose Fault?

Forgings—II

HOW far have we got with the forgings for our cannon? The right man to tell the story is the man who is making the forgings, and the right man for him to tell it to is his Congressman.

"My dear Congressman:

"Last May they called me to Washington and told me to make cannon. I told them they were crazy. I had never made a cannon in my life, or any part of a cannon. But they went right ahead telling me their plan.

"Here was the Bethlehem Steel Company. And here was the Midvale Steel Company. And that was about all, for forgings. The government arsenals did not make forgings. They bought forgings, and they finished forgings into cannon, but they did not make forgings. They were not equipped to make forgings. A few smaller private companies, outside Bethlehem and Midvale, had made a few forgings. But they were few, those forgings, and small. Our capacity, our real capacity, was simply Bethlehem and Midvale. And it had to be divided between the Army and the Navy. The Navy took Midvale, just about all of it. And the Army took Bethlehem. One place! One real large-scale, gun-forging place for the whole Army of a hundred million people! I began to see that I was due to be a cannon-maker.

"But I still held out. I said: 'Expand Bethlehem and let it go at that. Bethlehem knows the game.' But they said:

"'We'll expand Bethlehem, yes; and we've already ordered Bethlehem to expand. But we can't put everything into Bethlehem. Bethlehem might have a strike. The whole Bethlehem district might have a strike. Then all our cannon would be tied up tight, and the whole war would stop for us a while. We've got to spread this business out. We've got to start this war by stopping to teach the cannon-business to a lot of amateurs. And you're one of them.

"'But,' they said, 'it would take you five years to learn the cannon-business. So we're going to chop it up. We won't try to teach you how to make carriages for cannon. And we won't try to teach you how to finish cannon; we won't try to teach you how to take a "tube" and a "jacket" and assemble them and finish them. We'll teach you simply how to make the forgings. You will take steel ingots and forge them into "tubes" and "jackets" and then ship them to somebody else who will finish them. You and your organization will learn just one thing. And we will try to keep you on just one size, on just one calibre, of that one thing. So there you are! You're a specialist!'

"You see their plan, Congressman? Our cannon industry in America would be as follows:

"We would have Bethlehem, which is a sort of munitions-making department store, doing everything—forgings and finishings and carriages—complete. And we would have the government arsenals which leave the forgings out but which are equipped to do finishings and carriages. And we would have these new specialists—each one of them doing one type of forging, or one type of finishing, or one type of carriage, or even simply one type of recoil-mechanism for one type of carriage—each one of them learning his one little piece in the science of artillery by heart and then reciting it over and over again top-speed.

"All right. So much for the plan. Next came the plant. It had to be new. The expansion at Bethlehem had to be new. The facilities everywhere else had to be new. People like to think that we can take our gigantic existing facilities for making sewing-machines and use them tomorrow morning for making the recoil-mechanisms in gun-carriages; but we can't. What we can use is the *organization* which is familiar with that general sort of fine machine-work. But the equipment must be new. And the only place in which you make a 75-millimeter gun-forging is a 75-millimeter gun-forging shop.

"Some of the new men in gun-forgings were reasonably quick in getting their shops. One of them had a piece of ground covered with cottages. That was in August. He tore those cottages off, and he ran up his new buildings, and he got his hydraulic presses and accumulators and intensifiers and his boring-machines and his cranes and his furnaces and everything, and he installed them, and he manufactured forgings in January! Five months!

"And you know, Congressman, you can't go down to the corner hardware-store and buy these hydraulic presses and these boring-machines off a shelf. They have to be made for you. And the man who makes them must sometimes go back and make something else first.

"There is a firm in Chicago making boring-machines. They began by going outdoors in the middle of a blizzard and digging pits and laying foundations of concrete and erecting a set of planers, planers of a totally new type, monsters,

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prodigies, a hundred and eighty feet long. Then, on these planers, done in that concrete, resting in those pits, dug out of iron-hard ground, they proceeded to make boring-machines; but they had to make the planers first; and they had a man who stayed on the job without sleep for sixty hours, in the middle of that blizzard, with the temperature twelve degrees below zero, running his bare arm up to the elbow in every batch of cement to know it was the right heat. He did it and he was keen to do it and his name is Gabriel Longmuir of Coal City, Illinois, and he didn't get to the trenches but he got to heroism for this war all right.

"Well, the boring-machines come, and everything comes, and you have your plant, and you start to make a forging.

"You take your steel-ingot and you heat it red-hot and you put it under your press. The press comes down, and rests on the ingot gently, and is quiet for a moment, and then settles and squeezes. No hammering. The press rises; the ingot turns on its side and waits; the press hovers and descends; —and after a while you begin to have something that is shaped like a cannon. Then your troubles with it begin. You have to anneal it. You put it into a furnace, and heat it carefully to just the right temperature, and carefully let it cool. It is now as soft as it can properly be. Then you bore it. You scoop it out, you rough-machine it, inside, and you rough-machine it outside. And it is now a 'tube' or a 'jacket.' But you must still temper it. You heat it again to just the right heat, and plunge it gradually into oil, and cool it that way. And then you heat it once more to an exact temperature, and let it cool by itself. And then you pass it to the inspector from the Ordnance Department and hold your breath.

"But I'll tell you a remarkable thing. The forgings from the new fellows are averaging up absolutely just as good now as the forgings from Bethlehem and Midvale. Everybody gets a percentage of rejections. You are bound to make some of these forgings wrong, and the inspector throws them out. But the percentage of rejections at the new plants is absolutely not one bit bigger than the percentage at the old plants. The new fellows have got their grip now on this art.

"And now we mustn't get held up. Now we must really produce. Now we must get quantity. And that's what I wanted to talk to you about.

"I see you're getting after the Ordnance Department. Fine. Get after them. They need it. But don't stop there. Fix it so I don't get held up by *anything*.

"I was held up last fall and last winter and this spring because my coal didn't come; and I was held up because the railway-service broke down and my steel didn't come; and I was held up because there weren't any houses for my new workmen; and what did you do?

"You got the Housing Bill into Congress February 26th. The Senate passed it on May 1st. Two months!

"Congressman, the administrative departments have made *some* improvements in methods of administration. Have you made *any* improvements in methods of legislation?

"To make cannon you need boring-machines. To make cannon you also need houses for boring-machinists. The boring-machines are a detail. The houses are a detail. You make an appropriation for one detail. You do not make an appropriation for the other detail. You have to be converted to it. And it takes two months to convert you. And I'm held up. And you do this all the time. Why don't you drop it? Why don't you quit administrative details and get after the war in bulk?

"Hand the war money in one solid everlasting lump to the administrative departments, *and then follow them up*.

"You don't really follow them up now. You follow them down. You follow them down into all sorts of mistakes made last winter. All right. It does good. But I'm thinking about my coal and my steel for *next* winter. Appoint a committee, I say, to investigate *the future*. Appoint a Joint-Committee on the War-as-a-Whole.

"Then call in the Ordnance Department and say:

"'We understand that you have made a very considerable expansion in forgings. This expansion, we grieve to observe, does not extend to the largest sizes. For the largest sizes you still have to depend on the old capacity at Bethlehem. We reprove you. We think that you ought to have moved faster in the largest sizes. However, we understand that your programme for the largest sizes—for a great new expansion in the largest sizes—is all worked out now and all ready to go into effect. And we realize that your existing expansion, accomplished in the last year, is tremendous. Our American gun-forging capacity today, in assembled shops, in going businesses, is at least ten times what it was a year ago. That is your estimate. And we take your estimate. And we congratulate you. But we mean to follow you up. We notice that you have a shortage of labor at Bethlehem and, on top of the shortage, a strike—a strike of several thousand men. Now tell us. What are your plans for giving these forging-manufacturers of yours a steady supply of labor and a steady supply of coal and a steady supply of steel and a steady supply of everything else? We will give up trying to instruct you about the calibres of

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guns and about the elevations and traverses of gun-carriages. But we can certainly help you to organize the United States. Satisfy us. Here's your capacity. Are you going to be able to operate it full-speed, day and night, all this summer and all next winter? Are you sure? Why?'

"They are not sure. The United States is not organized. A lot of that capacity will lie idle a total of thousands of hours between now and next spring if things go on as at present.

"And then call Garfield in, and say:

"'Do you know where these forging-manufacturers are? We understand that they are scattered now through Pennsylvania and Ohio and Indiana and Illinois. This is Cannon Year. We are getting some machine-guns. And we are getting rifles all right. But we are way behind on cannon. And this war is still a cannon war. And these forgings are the beginnings of cannon. Where have you listed the men who make them? Are you sure that you won't be feeding coal to machine-gun manufacturers, who may be ahead of the game, while forging-manufacturers, who may be behind the game, have empty bins? Last winter, to our knowledge, a forging manufacturer was shut down for two weeks without coal, while flower-conservatories in his district had lots of coal. Are you going to do better next winter? If so, show us how. And show us now.'

"And call McAdoo in, and say:

"'Have you got enough mechanics now in your railway-repair-shops to keep your locomotives repaired next winter? And if you have, and if there is still a scarcity of railway service, as there will be, then where do cannon manufacturers come in, on your list of preferences and priorities? This is Cannon Year, Mr. McAdoo. Has anybody told you it is Cannon Year? We go against the Germans next year with artillery, or Heaven knows if we ever go against them. Take all the cars and locomotives away from every collar-manufacturer and every pleasure-car-manufacturer and every talking-machine-manufacturer and every piano-manufacturer and every other non-essential manufacturer, and bankrupt him, but get cannon. What are your plans? Let us see them now.'

"And ask Baruch and ask Secretary of Labor Wilson and, if you've got the nerve, ask President Wilson. You talk a lot about autocracy. The President must be an autocrat. It's your duty to make him an autocrat. And then it's your duty to cross-examine him.

"The programmes are made, Congressman, and now it's shirt-sleeves.

"First. From Midvale we're getting 8-inch forgings. Midvale belongs to the Navy, but it's making one type of gun for the Army—a British-model 8-inch howitzer, complete, including forgings.

"Next. From Bethlehem we're getting two British models—a 75-millimeter gun and a 9.2-inch howitzer, both complete, including forgings. And from Bethlehem, incidentally, we're also getting forgings for the French and we're managing to ship them to France, all the time. If the French are making guns for us, don't forget that we're making forgings for them, in quantity, in millions of pounds.

"Third. From Bethlehem and from our new plants, put together, we're getting forgings for our own American models, and for our adopted or adapted French models, in all the small and middle-heavy sizes—75-millimeter, 4.7 inch, 155-millimeter, 240-millimeter—from about three inches along up to about nine-and-a-half inches.

"And the programme for the heaviest guns, the hardest and the last, is fixed. It's not design now. It's sweat. We've got to take our most backward thing—artillery—and pull it up out of the ruck, with all we can of labor, and all we can of coal, and all we can of railway-service, and all we can of everything else we have, and put it in the very first line of our efforts and achievements.

"Pound the Ordnance Department. Yes. Shake that new programme for our big heavies out of it quick. Treat it as rough as you please. But get started right. For a Cannon Summer and a Cannon Winter, get started right. The thing can't be done by the Ordnance Department alone.

"It needs a central control and a central look-out. The President has refused to make a central control. He has refused to make a central directorate, capable of holding the noses of all departments on this task. I lost twelve machinists yesterday. They went to a shipyard. The Emergency Fleet Corporation out-bid the Ordnance Department in the wages of machinists. Now I will steal twelve machinists if I can from somebody who is making submarine-chasers for the Navy. There is no central control. Very well. Make a central look-out.

"Make a central look-out of your own, at your own end of Pennsylvania Avenue. You have a right to do it. You have a duty to do it. Make a committee looking not at the past but at the future and looking not at details but at the total of this whole fight for the safety of all mankind, and you will find out *now* what is going to hold up cannon *to-morrow,* and you can shout it to the country, and you can make the country come to its toes, and the administration with it, and you will force a central control, or something like a central control, and we will get cannon, and we will win this war."

WILLIAM HARD.

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The "Coalition Battle" of 1918

It should be understood that this account of the battle of Picardy covers only the first phase of the battle, which I personally followed closely during my last stay in France. The account may help in understanding better the further developments of the situation, which have been daily brought to our notice in the communiqués.

The First Phase in Picardy, from March 21st to April 5th

THE "terrific" offensive which Germany announced to the world as a punishment to the Allies for not accepting a German peace began on March 21st. On the British front of Picardy first, then on that of Artois and Flanders, it was soon transformed into a series of battles where British and French were mingled. Finally, fighting has been going on for over a month on the 200 kilometer front stretching from the Aisne to the Belgian coast, fighting which would seem to be predestined to determine the fate of the nations.

In this seeming confusion, several distinct phases can be noted. The first was a gigantic battle in Picardy which, in spite of undeniable tactical successes for the enemy, ended in a failure of the German plan. Such is the conclusion at present from a rapid analysis of this plan, of the means employed for its execution, and of the results obtained as compared with those expected.

The German Plan

From an examination of the new plan of the enemy command on the fighting line, of the organization of their attacks, and orders found on prisoners, one may assume that the German General Staff project was as follows:

In the north, the Crown Prince of Bavaria with the second and seventeenth German armies of von der Marwitz and von Below intended to break the third and fifth British armies toward Péronne and throw the bulk of the English forces into the north.

In the south, the Imperial Crown Prince with the eighteenth army of Hutier was to crush the British right wing and open up the roads to Amiens and Beauvais.

In other words, the attempt was to separate the English and French armies first, and afterwards to defeat the British army, once it had been cut off from all direct support of the French. It was the same idea as at Verdun in 1916: to separate the Allies in such a way that they could not coordinate their action on the same front or at the same time, and then try to defeat them separately; but this time the means employed were tremendous, for it was the entire German army which was engaged on one battle front. A simple and glorious plan which should, according to Ludendorff, have led to the speedy termination of the war —on the condition, however, that he had formerly dealt with weaker adversaries. This is a reservation which Ludendorff should have made!

The Operations from March 21st to April 5th

After a mighty moral and material preparation, demonstrated by the size, the violence and the persistence of the attacks, the Germans made one furious assault after another upon the British front. Between Arras and La Fère on an 80, then on a 120 kilometer front, they threw in ten fresh divisions a day, plus the troops already occupying this sector. A most violent struggle immediately ensued; 80 divisions were engaged in the first week. Before this massive attack, while the English shells wrought great havoc, the British armies were forced to fall back. The third army in the north defended the ground inch by inch. The fifth was knocked about on the Somme and its retreat led to the engagement of the entire British force upon the front.

On the evening of the 26th the enemy had advanced 35 kilometers. The situation was serious. French divisions were thrown into battle after the first two or three days to support the British right wing and to check the enemy's advance in the south. Transported in motor trucks, they entered into action without awaiting their artillery and energetically held their position. Others were on the way to join them.

The fighting was sometimes in the open, sometimes in trenches. From the third day, the battle assumed such extension, complexity and violence that it was no longer possible to run such risks without strengthening the command. It seemed clear that cooperation among the different Commanders in Chief was not sufficient in such a crisis and that it could not compare with the authority of one responsible chief. The Allied governments on March 26th entrusted to General Foch, French Chief of Staff, whose past career during the war as well as fine personal characteristics indicated him for this choice, the mighty task of coordinating operations and of undertaking the direction of strategy.

From the 27th, his personal force could already be felt as during the great days of Marne and Ypres in 1914. The first Anglo-French stand took

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

BATTLE OF PICARDY

From an official map. The numerals indicate the date in March on which the various areas were captured.

place on the 28th. From March 28th to April 5th, the German offensive weakened, grew narrower and stopped exhausted within range of Amiens.

During this second week, the enemy had again engaged 26 divisions, or a total of 110 since the beginning; but they only advanced about ten kilometers and along an ever decreasing front. The unity of the Anglo-French armies had been maintained. The rapid and incessant arrival of the French reserves supported and upheld the British troops along half the fighting line and removed from the enemy every chance if not every hope of smashing the line in Picardy. The scheme failed. The 30th of March was the date of the last big blow in Picardy. On that day the Germans attacked along a 120 kilometer front with terrific energy, only to end in a complete and bloody check. They could not renew such efforts in the days to come; their attacks, though still violent, would be local ones, like the struggles of a bird of prey whose victim is escaping him. The first phase in Picardy was over.

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Results

The enemy had engaged 110 divisions in two weeks; in other words, over one-half of their total forces on the western front, to occupy a region mostly devastated, 60 kilometers in length and 80 kilometers in breadth. Their communiqués announced the capture of 70,000 British among whom were many wounded, and several hundred guns. The Allies soon replaced these losses. They are, however, tactical successes of which it would be childish to deny the importance. Nevertheless, over half the German forces were engaged within two weeks, at the cost of bloody losses, to take Montdidier and approach Amiens, without any direct bearing upon the outcome of the war. Are these the results Germany expected for such a sacrifice?

We do not think so. We even think that the disappointment to the German General Staff was deep and immediate. The main aim, that of separating the Anglo-French forces, having failed, they had to seek something else. They had to turn to the offensives of Artois and of Flanders. But the smashing battle with which Ludendorff intended to end the war was transformed in spite of him into a battle of exhaustion which he did not want; for if he had wanted it he would not have thrown half of his best forces with so much determination into a struggle which was rapidly using them up.

We conclude that the German offensive in Picardy ended in an undeniable German tactical success, that it severely shook the Anglo-French front, but that it did not smash it and for this very reason is of no strategic importance, thus signifying in spite of everything the initial check of the German plan.

The recent operations in the north are consequently not, according to us, the logical development of the original plan, after the first part failed, but rather the efforts of the German command to finish off the British forces even without first realizing the essential condition of such a plan. But henceforth the enemy will find the Allies closely united under one firm command on all sides.

Taking now a broader view of the military situation in France, it appears clearly that a new phase of the war, reminding us in some respects of the campaign in October, 1914, was opened with the present battle.

Up to now, on the western front, the British and French have fought offensive or defensive battles, either army by itself, or one in limited cooperation with the other. The battle fronts, not exceeding 30, 40 or 50 kilometers, never called for the entire resources of both the armies.

Everybody knows what advantage an extension of the battle front would give to the one of the adversaries who could obtain it first. But the extension of front must be in proportion to the war material and man power. After providing the necessary material and man power the Allies were prevented from obtaining the advisable extension of their battle front owing to the lack of unity of command. At the same time the Germans could not effect it before 1918, on account of their shortage of available reserves; but they constantly reinforced their unity of command.

As a consequence of the Russian defection and of the Rumanian peace, the situation was temporarily changed. The Germans were able to launch one or several offensives on wider lines proportional to the increase of their establishment on the French front, which now amounts for all practical purposes to the whole German army.

It is sufficient to say that from a total of 241 German divisions there were 202 in France at the beginning of April, as against 130 on the first of January, 1917, and 157 on the first of January 1918. Thanks to these reinforcements, the last German offensive against the British started on an 80 kilometer front, which was extended to 120 kilometers on March 30th.

To meet such a tremendous force on such an extended front all the French and British resources were required, and in order to be successful they had to fight in close cooperation—even sometimes mingled one with another. It was less a question for the French of supporting the British than of merely going and fighting with them. Because, for the French, as well as for each Allied army, the battle is where the enemy directs his main effort. Thus the battle in 1918 becomes really a "battle of coalition," in which British, French, American, Belgian and Portuguese are fighting together and must fight so until the end.

Such a battle requires more and more man power, but more than anything else a very strong unity of command. This unity is not only necessary to assure the strategical direction of the operations, it is also the only way to remedy the lack of homogeneity which is inevitable with such a number of allied troops. But, in order that the Commander in Chief may at any given time actually work along the line of unity of action, he must in the shortest possible time be provided by the Allied governments with all the means necessary to such a unity of command, mainly with as great a number of troops as possible.

This has become very evident from the events of last March. The lesson is the happy result for the Allies of the bitter experience of the battle of Picardy.

EDOUARD RÉQUIN,
Major, French General Staff.

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CORRESPONDENCE

Reply to a Reviewer

SIR: "R. B.'s" review of Mr. Alexander's Man's Supreme Inheritance exhibits such ingenuity in evading perception of its significant points that it seems worth while to make a statement for the protection of readers who might otherwise be misled. Mr. Alexander's book is not concerned with setting forth instrumental, pragmatic or evolutionary philosophy, within which is wrapped a personal intuition or quasi-magical personal knack. His critical contention is that the remediable ills from which humanity suffers on the physical side (with the intellectual and moral ills that result) are due to disassociation of the "higher" nervous structures and functions — those which are at the basis of our conscious life — from the "lower" — those which are involved in the execution of bodily postures and movements. Roughly speaking, the latter represent our animal inheritance, "instincts," which have been changed into our habitual attitudes and acts (the "subconscious") without conscious perception and control. The former represent the distinctly human additions up-to-date, our acquired civilization. Mr. Alexander contends that our education, which covers, of course, infinitely more than our schooling, has proceeded as if the centres of conscious activity had been merely superimposed upon the neuromuscular structures which represent our heredity from the lower animals. As a result we get evils which are unknown to the animals and to the savages whose intellectual achievements have not become sufficiently complex to override the animal functions. But civilized persons, especially the intellectuals and specialized persons who are leaders, cultivate their "brains" as if they were separate from the rest of the body. Meantime, muscular co-ordinations, or habits, are formed under the novel conditions of civilization. Hence, they work neither in their natural estate nor with the advantage of control by intelligence, the functioning of the higher centres. The net outcome, in Mr. Alexander's contention, is the larger number of physical disorders which inflict themselves exclusively upon civilized man, and the large number of neuroses which express themselves in intellectual and moral maladies. The claim is sweeping and as simple as it is sweeping. If the book is worth reviewing, the thesis is worth stating.

Mr. Alexander's positive principle is, in effect, an education which will integrate the functions now so disastrously divided. The principle is experimental; it can be asserted and rendered intelligible in a book; proof lies in *doing* it. From the book the idea which the *reader* can get will be but a more or less clear "intuition." To say, as "R. B." does, that it is an intuition with Mr. Alexander is to intimate that he is either the most self-deluded of mortals or that he is deliberate faker of the first magnitude. The cleverness which presents a principle which claims to be one of conscious control, as if it were a matter of personal intuition, is not a cleverness which I envy "R. B."

With adults the integration which is accomplished by the technique at Mr. Alexander's command, is obviously a re-education that is at best remedial and more or less palliative. With subsequent generations it can, to the degree in which it is utilized with children, become positive and constructive. If Mr. Alexander is wrong, the name given to the estate of humanity which would ultimately be produced is of no consequence. If he is right, the change would be so great, the stage introduced into the history of humanity would be of such crucial significance that the use of the word evolution in connection with it is at most a mere matter of literary taste.

"R. B." says that the task suggested is "a little appalling," that "if the school must wait till every one of its children has learned conscious guidance and control, the next step in evolution will be very long delayed." It would be hard to find a greater tribute to the integrity of Mr. Alexander's method than is conveyed in this unconscious confession. It marks the difference between reliance upon some scheme of magic and the more than a "little" appalling task which confronts man if his civilization is not to end in a tragedy. Certainly one of the prime effects of acquaintance with the method of "conscious control" is to make one realize the superficial and over-hasty character of the methods upon which we are relying, and the corresponding importance of a fundamental method of education, one which in the course of slow generations will integrate into harmonious coordination our animal inheritance and our distinctively human capacities of intelligence.

JOHN DEWEY.

New York City.

The Unstable Social Worker

SIR: Perhaps it lies in my power to answer, in part, the question of A. L. C., in the issue of March 16th, as to why the volunteer social worker is "unstable."

In the case of the young girls—judging from my own, before I left the parental roof—mothers are probably very largely to be blamed. The plea "Mother thinks I have undertaken too much" is doubtless valid as a rule. Such was invariably my own mother's attitude toward every work of this nature which I undertook. And I think her point of view was typical of the mothers—of the "society" class, at any rate. She maintained that girls who go in for social service, church and club work, tended to become "hacks" and lost their freshness and attractiveness, that they grew amazingly intense and serious, and for these reasons would not draw the attentions of men. She considered that the claims of home and "society" were sufficient for a young girl to meet. From the practical standpoint the ground she took was, I am afraid, quite tenable. A young girl's chief business in life was to make a good marriage, and there is no denying that the very great majority of marriageable men will not interest themselves in girls who are in earnest about anything but pleasing and amusing. Which brings the ultimate blame back upon the men—rather than upon the mothers, one would say. Of course, too, having engagements for social service work interferes with having engagements for affairs where eligible youths are to be met.

As to married women of the leisure class who are unreliable for social service, it is my personal observation that the husbands are generally to be held accountable. They are not pleased at having their wives place any obligation before that of being at liberty to come and go as they themselves may desire. It takes a high order of resolution to stand out against the constant pressure of a disapproving or aggrieved attitude in the home.

X.

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Books and Things

THREE years ago an English writer said, in words which are certainly no less true today: "The present is no era for untimely generosity. Those who advocate treating the enemy well, and giving him good terms, should be sure first that we have the upper hand—should be sure indeed that the enemy realizes and admits that fact—otherwise it will seem only like weakness." Even when we have gained the upper hand the terms are not to be so very easy. Those highly placed German criminals, the organizers of wholesale atrocities, must be punished. Germany "has no need of any 'colonies' in the Pacific; they may be considered emancipated from its hated rule." "The 'Prussian' navy is too dangerous a weapon to leave in the hands of those who wish for world dominance."

These extracts, taken by themselves, might give one the notion that their author, Sir Oliver Lodge, was a bitter-ender. So he is, in many of his practical aims, but not at all in spirit. Germans, he says, are unchivalrous, they lack humor, "they lack the most elementary notions of honorable conduct," but "not all of them—not all those at sea, for instance; and of course only some of those on land." After victory over Germany "no restrictions or hampering of the peaceful development of German industry and commerce should be enforced." After the war the Germany to which we owe so much science and learning and art will be re-born; it will throw off the shackles of a cramping and overpowering despotism of evil; and once more, I sincerely trust, we shall be friends."

In the same book, The War and After, which appeared in England almost three years ago and has just been republished in this country (New York: George H. Doran Company. $1.50), one can find sentences which a pacifist might wish he had written: "And going back to the very earliest writings, in the most bloodthirsty outpourings of the Hebrew prophets for example, you will find that at the base of the warrior spirit is hate for more complicated, for more refined, for more beautiful and happier living . . . The easy belief of the dull and violent that war 'braces' arises from a real instinct of self-preservation, a fear of the subtler tests of peace. The uncultured type of person will preserve war as long as he can. This type is to politics what the criminal type is to social order; it is resentful and hostile to every attempt to organize pacific order in the world." Of war as it must now be conducted Sir Oliver Lodge says that it is "a dull and dirty business, and the accessories of its organization are much more closely related to the discipline associated with convict labor than ever before."

But no pacifist will take comfort in Sir Oliver's conviction that "if the foe has guns and machinery we must employ guns and machinery too," that "seldom indeed in any war is the issue so sharp as in the present one," that "death and bodily pain are not the worst of evils," and that "the typical pacifist was Pilate."

Such quotations as I have been making are unfair if they leave the impression that Sir Oliver Lodge's self is divided, that his attitude is not clear. I do not see how even extreme bitter-enders or extreme pacifists could read his book and bring such a charge against him. He hates war and is heart and soul for this war and for victory. He hates German megalomania and faithlessness and cruelty, but he believes Germany will yield a useful residuum after this war has taught her that these miserable qualities do not pay. His is a book in which many English virtues unconsciously draw their own portraits. It is magnanimous and resolute, tolerant and terribly in earnest, kind and valiant, religious and practical.

Sir Oliver's book is also naïf here and there, a little eccentric, decidedly miscellaneous. He quotes from Colonel Roosevelt, Tolstoi, Milton, Mr. Shaw, Wordsworth, Swinburne, Plotinus, Mr. Wells, Nietzsche, Mrs. Browning, Jeremiah and Mr. Harold Begbie. There are admirable pages on the neglect of chemical research by the British government and by English manufacturers, there are lucid, expository pages which only a physicist could have written, there is misunderstanding of labor's contentions, there is a stray opinion that Italy is fighting for the integrity of Serbia, criticism of war office methods, a page about noisy and unsightly advertising, there are unexpected jokes like this: "Given favorable conditions for development and education, every other child born into the world seems likely to promise notable service—else how comes it that the sons of peers so frequently blossom into Diplomatists and Civil Servants and able Governors and holders of important positions under the Crown?"

The religious opinions expressed in this book are plainly a large and precious element in the faith that Sir Oliver Lodge lives by. They have both power to steel the heart and also a healing beauty. They have entered deep into his high and noble spirit. To say this about them is to have said all that I am sure of. When he is justifying the ways of God to man I try to understand, and I fail. What turned the Germans back, he asks, after Mons and before the battle of the Marne? And here is his answer: "I do not know. I doubt if any one fully and completely knows. September 3rd was a critical day. It is a war against Principalities and Powers and spiritual wickedness in high places. I myself believe in assistance from on High." But at the end of his book Sir Oliver says: "People ask despairingly sometimes why man-made evils are permitted, why, if Divine interposition is a reality, they are not stopped by supernatural force. They do not understand the conditions. Free-will, for better for worse, has been granted to the human race; and a Divine Treaty cannot be torn up." Taken together, these two passages appear to mean that Providence may intervene in a single battle without violating a Divine Treaty which would be violated if Providence intervened in every battle, or intervened in time to prevent war. Hence I infer that I have missed their meaning.

Much clearer do I find what Sir Oliver has written about Christ's attitude toward a righteous war. Nature, history and experience all call sufficient attention to the strong and fierce and dangerous aspects of Deity. It was therefore unnecessary for Christ to emphasize these. Besides, "his lifetime happened in a period—one of the few periods—of world peace." From the parable of the good shepherd, who fought the wolf, from the violence with which Christ drove the money-changers out of the Temple, from what he said of the wrath to come, we can, however, infer that he would have wished us to resist evil force with force. "It is the divine attributes of Deity that we have to learn, not their merely human aspect only; and some of those attributes are fierce and inexorable. With all the powers of the Universe at His command He can stand by while inhuman tortures are inflicted, and interfere no more than He did at the scourging and the crucifixion. Great pain can evidently be tolerated by One who sees both before and after, with far-reaching vision."

P. L.

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The Root of German Evil

Militarism and Statecraft, by Munroe Smith. New York: Putnams. $1.50.

NO large proportion of the recent mass of writings purporting to set forth the causes of war will prove illuminating to future generations. A propagandist purpose colors most of them, and this is often most clearly evident in the work of scholars, who might be expected to cleave to the plain truth. The notorious manifesto of the German professors has its manifold counterparts elsewhere. This is of course easily explained in terms of human nature. When the whole world is mad with the rage of war, can the savant permit his solidarity with ordinary mankind to be impugned by an exhibition of unclouded sanity?

There are scholars who have dared to assume the risk of remaining pure scholars, with the unanticipated result that theirs turns out to be the most effective propaganda after all. In this gallant remnant of devotees to the truth, a high place must be assigned to Professor Munroe Smith, whose brilliant essays on the war, modestly addressed to a narrow audience of experts, have by their sheer clarity and force commanded the respectful attention of intelligent men throughout the half of the world that is fighting for civilization. In the preface to a collection of these essays, published under the title of Militarism and Statecraft, Professor Munroe Smith states that his "effort is primarily not to condemn nor to excuse but to understand." In his entire book there is not a sentence, not a turn of a phrase, that offers an intimation that he has departed from this purpose.

In order to criticize with understanding the German policy of which the fruit is the present war, it is necessary to premise a standard of statecraft. Professor Munroe Smith selects for his standard not the idealistic policies of a John Bright or a Gladstone, but the quite practical standards of Bismarck. Would the diplomacy of the present empire have met the approval of even that frank apostle of force? Bismarck utterly repudiated the idea of a war for the augmenting of national prestige; but prestige was plainly one of the important objects of German policy in forcing this war. Bismarck placed great value upon the defensive position. Even when his purpose was pure aggression, he always managed to manoeuvre the adversary into the wrong. But in this war there never was any doubt in the minds of Germany's adversaries or of the neutrals that Germany was the aggressor. And even the German people themselves can hardly remain much longer in doubt on this point. Bismarck was at pains to assure himself in advance that alliances would hold and the neutrals remain friendly. On both points the present German diplomacy failed signally.

It is an easy conclusion that the German statesmen of today are mediocrities, incapable of devising a workable policy of their own or even of following the principles worked out by Bismarck. But this is to miss the real meaning of the failure of German policy. As in Bismarck's time, German diplomacy before and during the war has been in conflict with military strategy. The military strategists of today, like those of Bismarck's generation, would know nothing of the moral advantage of the defensive position, of the just sentiments of mankind. As in the days of Bismarck, the military strategists wanted to strike before the enemy could prepare, no matter how their action might appear to the world. They wanted to plunge straight forward toward the strongest enemy, whatever moral or legal obstacles stood in their way. The difference between the two epochs of German policy appears to consist essentially in the fact that the military strategists have increased enormously in power while diplomacy has become weak. Bismarck dominated the strategists and employed them as instruments of his policy. At the outbreak of this war, and down to the present day, the strategists have been in the saddle. They have shaped German policy, leaving to diplomacy the wretched task of giving it moral plausibility.

If diplomacy of the Bismarckian character had remained in control of the national policy, the course of events might easily have been quite different, and vastly more favorable to Germany. This is made clear, once for all, by Professor Munroe Smith's chapter on Diplomacy versus Military Strategy. Assuming that it was vital to Germany to checkmate Russian influence in the Balkans, even at the risk of war, it would not have been difficult so to manipulate the Serbian situation as to force Russia either to back down completely or to accept the rôle of aggressor. Toward France Germany could have assumed a purely defensive attitude. With the excellent strategic frontier established by Bismarck in the war of 1870 a relatively small force of Germans would have sufficed to hold back the French, even if France had come to the aid of her ally; something by no means inevitable, if Russia had been the aggressor. The bulk of the German and Austrian forces might then have been thrown against Russia, with the preliminary result that East Prussia, Galicia and Bukowina would have been spared the horrors of invasion, and with the ultimate result of a complete collapse of Russia. There would have been no occasion for an invasion of Belgium and no ground for British belligerency while Russia was being disposed of. The German fleet would have had the freedom of the seas, to operate lawfully against French trade unless France remained neutral. Italy would not have dared to enter the war, and there would have been no reason for undertaking a submarine warfare that was bound sooner or later to drag America and other neutrals into the war against Germany. Can there be any doubt that with such a plan of campaign Germany would long since have dictated peace to Russia, and to France if she had attacked? Such indeed had been the plan of Bismarck in the event of a war in which Russia and France attacked simultaneously. It had the support of the great Moltke, and could not have failed entirely of consideration by the German statesmen. How shall we account for the policy actually pursued? We must assume not only that military strategy overrode diplomacy, but that there was a force operating independently toward aggression on the west. Officially Germany has asserted that this war was in origin an eastern war, the purpose of which was to check Russian aggression in the Balkans. But the plan of campaign gives this assertion the lie. Industrial Belgium and North France appear quite plainly to have been something more than incidental objectives of German aggression.

In the conduct of the war there is again abundant evidence of the utter subjugation of diplomacy to military strategy. The German has proved a dirty fighter and an incredibly ruthless oppressor of civil populations under his control. This fact has led the superficial student to posit an inherently, incorrigibly barbarian German. But there is nothing new in German frightfulness. It is the logical outcome of militarism, uncurbed by civil diplomacy capable of recognizing that the order established by shooting hostages and wasting villages, the retardation of munitions

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shipments produced by the lawless sinkings of commercial vessels, are military advantages that may be bought at too high a price.

Military strategy in control of the state and imposing its will upon diplomacy serves to explain the events leading immediately to the war, as well as the general plan upon which the war has been conducted. But there are ulterior causes of the war that are not so easily explained. When one reflects upon the unanimity with which the people accepted the war, the universal approval of methods of warfare that have shocked the whole civilized world, one is tempted to subscribe to the popular doctrine that there is in German militarism and German life something peculiar, something alien to ordinary human instincts. But such a doctrine is summarily dismissed by Professor Munroe Smith.

"Neither in German militarism nor in German national desires and illusions has the author been able to find anything unprecedented or novel, anything that does not exist or has not at some time existed among other nations, except—and the exception is important—in degree and extent. The military mind, in so far as it tends to differ from the non-military mind, is everywhere the same, alike in its special point of view and in its special tendencies." The Germans have held to a doctrine of absolute sovereignty which refuses to recognize the subordination of the single state to the community of nations. It is a pernicious doctrine; it serves to justify the breaking of treaties and the application of brutal constraint to weaker nations whenever this may appear to be profitable. But the doctrine is of Roman, not German invention, and it has adherents outside of Germany who are merely not numerous enough to dominate national policy. The German people hungered for more land, and speculated upon the advantages of the inclusion within their boundaries of adjacent territories, stripped of their encumbering native population. There is nothing peculiarly German about land hunger, but in no other modern state does it reach an intensity comparable with that which has been so strikingly exhibited in the burst of German annexationist literature since the war. The Germans regarded themselves as a superior breed, but what great people does not? But in Germany this species of self worship has been developed into a mania. The German believes himself entrusted with a conquering mission, but the fatal idea of a national mission is not new in history. The German has an overconfidence in the sufficiency of logic as a guide in the tangled relations of politics. The consequence is disaster, for part of the data upon which intelligent political action must be based always refuses to be imprisoned in a syllogism. But Germany has no monopoly of the wise fools who blunder about trying to make the political facts of life fit their abstract logic. All the forces that have conspired to make Germany the enemy of mankind are present in the national life of every people. They have not elsewhere attained to such rank growth; that is the sole difference.

A corollary which Professor Munroe Smith does not draw, but which follows of necessity from his argument, is that the work of pacification will not be completed once for all with the overthrow of Germany. The vices that have made of Germany a menace and a curse are present in our own political and social organization: it behooves us to keep them in check. We too generate the military mind; it behooves us to see that its functions are restrained to the carrying out of the calmly reasoned policies of the civil nation. We too exhibit numerous instances of national pride degenerating into know-nothingism and megalomania. We too prate occasionally of a mission transcending the legitimate sphere of setting before the world an example of a nation democratically and efficiently governed in its domestic and its international relations. And if in the exuberance of our national environment the better, saner, more generous Americanism has nevertheless remained dominant, this is rather by our good fortune than by any conscious effort of our own. But for the grace of God we might have become a Germany and a curse to mankind.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

Interpretative History

The Chartist Movement, by Mark Hovell. New York: Longmans, Green Co. $2.50.

PROFESSOR TOUT has done a very considerable service in editing and publishing this book. Fragmentary as it necessarily is, it yet, on the whole, represents the best account we possess of a tragic but fruitful period of history. It makes one certain that had Mr. Hovell lived he would have been a valuable recruit to that small group of men and women who are rewriting for us the history of England in the terms of the thoughts and aspirations of the common folk. Books like those of Mr. Tawney on the enclosure movement, of Mr. and Mrs. Hammond on the urban and village laborer, of Mr. and Mrs. Webb on English local government, in reality represent nothing so much as an epoch in historiography. It is an epoch, indeed, that in some sort goes back to J. R. Green's Short History; and there is an important sense in which Mr. Wallas's life of Francis Place is the head and centre of the whole effort; but, in its full function, it is a movement born of that socialized liberalism which triumphed at the general election of 1906. It is great history because it is interpretative history. It is great history because, casting aside the unscientific assertion of impartiality, it seeks to obtain the lesson the living past contains for our own time. It is performing for our generation something of the function that Macaulay performed for his own day. It is showing, that is to say, that the liberal outlook for which this generation is coming to be the sponsor, has its roots in the past, and a pedigree that is at least respectable. It is showing that the impulses that liberalism seeks to translate into political terms are not the imaginative creations of an intellectual cave of Adullam, but the perennial characteristics of large masses of men who, until our own day, have largely remained inarticulate. By the investigation of our genealogy it is giving us a new and vital confidence in the rightness of our effort. That is the background which gives such a special importance to the new history of our time.

The investigation of Chartism, moreover, has a special interest for ourselves. It has the fundamental qualities of an age of transition—lawlessness, on the one hand, and a vague assertion of natural rights upon the other. That is not to say that it must be straightway condemned. In any period where a new equilibrium is being effected the old content of law will be deemed inadequate; and that can, in its turn, only involve a refusal to accept the categories of that law. Natural rights, in any historical sense, may be, as Bentham said, nonsense upon stilts; but their revival only means that at each period of discontent men will go back to the foundations of the state. Chartism came as the demand for a release from intolerable condi-

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tions of economic servitude. It was a protest, on the one hand against the machine-philosophy of Manchester, and on the other against the utilitarianism which identified expediency with right. It must never be forgotten that the Reform Bill of 1832 only released the political energies of the urban middle class. It did nothing for the laborer who has had to wait until our own time for the full recognition of his political status. Chartism was the natural reaction against conditions which the conspiracy law prevented trade-unions from effectively changing. It was a protest—as the Poor Law report of 1909 has shown, a legitimate protest—against the inhumanity of the Poor Law of 1834. It was a claim for decent conditions of life against the intolerable despotism of the new factories. It bound up within itself all of the disinherited who were convinced that in any adequately organized community the worth of human personality should obtain due recognition. It has in it the simple pathos of men who want above all things relief from an endless toil. It represents the simple faith which accepts the finality of political power. It was from the outset doomed to failure partly because the full energy of the reformers had been exhausted in the effort of 1832; partly, also, because it fell into the hands of leaders by their nature incapable of leading any movement to victory. They had none of the respectability and doggedness of Joseph Hume. They lacked the directness of Bright and Cobden. They had nothing of that sheer genius for political manipulation which gives to Place so unique a position in the history of England.

It is a tragic failure the more in that every single article of faith for which the movement stood, has, with a single exception, found a place upon the English statute book; and not one of those articles has been adopted as a result of working-class agitation. That was the basic error of Chartism—to have mistaken the temporal conditions of its effort. The middle class that had just attained power could not have been persuaded, within a decade, to part with it. The middle class could see in men like O'Connor and Bronterre O'Brien no more than trick adventurers; Hetherington, Vincent and Julian Harney were typical examples of professional radicalism. All of them talked in large and splendid terms of a Utopia to be builded the day after tomorrow; each of them was convinced that his own personal leadership could alone be efficacious. Not one of them, save perhaps the hapless Frost, had the true courage of his revolutionary convictions; and O'Connor, notably, at the time when his personal bravery was put to the test, singularly failed his followers. The one man of outstanding character and energy in the movement is William Lovett—on all showing a noble soul invaluable in the personal stimulus that inspires men greater than himself to action, but utterly useless for any practical purpose. There is no evidence that the Chartist movement had the unity of purpose that revolution requires. O'Connor only wanted notoriety. Birmingham devoted its energies either to the pet currency scheme of Attwood or the pet franchise scheme of Sturge. The skilled artisan was attracted to the Corn Law repeal where Bright and Cobden could show definite prospect of immediate improvement. Corn law repeal had none of the recklessness of Chartism—a recklessness from which the mass usually suffered while the leaders escaped. They saw easily that a movement which the House of Commons merely treated with contempt, which could not answer the facile bitterness of Macaulay and Lord John Russell and Peel, which commanded the sympathy only of the wretched and despairing, was inevitably doomed to failure. Under able leaders the movement might well have become a revolution of the disinherited; under those who controlled it, its failure has about it something of the remorselessness of a logical process.

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Yet, even in its failure, it illustrated a general truth of signal importance at this time. It demonstrated beyond peradventure how mistaken it is to direct the energy of the working-classes solely into the channels of political reform. That was where Robert Owen was wiser than his generation. He understood that if the system of loyalties erected by the state is inadequate the true method is not to attempt its destruction but to erect an alternative system in the certainty that, sooner or later it will indirectly permeate the old. Immediately the disappointment with political effort led the workers to turn back to the economic struggle in factory and mill, the new model unionism effected a revolution not less in politics than in industry. Nor has that been less the truth of our own day. The effort of the Labor party in Parliament has been far less fruitful than the effort of trade-unionists outside the House of Commons. Minor surrenders and unimportant concessions may well be achieved; but upon the fundamental question of industrial control nothing serious is to be looked for from the agencies of a capitalist state. That has been the lesson of the war in England; and the British commissions on industrial unrest have reported a lack of confidence in government which may well presage the breakdown of parliamentary democracy. Here, indeed, Mr. Henderson has seen the danger of thinking of political controversy in the over-simple terms of the Marxian synthesis; and he has had the gates of the Labor party thrown open to the sympathizers in every class. What will result no man may

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prophesy; yet even here it is legitimate to doubt whether the real arena of the struggle will be within the House of Commons.

Mr. Hovell's book is an admirable narrative of the movement he has analyzed. It is not, indeed, a sympathetic book. I think it vastly underrates the difficulties by which the Chartists were confronted. They had to deal not with police but with the military, and the problem of a sufficient disorder was thus made far more complex. He does not adequately emphasize the absence of support in the House of Commons from those who might have been expected to render it. He does not realize how much force was taken from the movement from the very breadth of the path towards social reform. If, for instance, the movement had come ten years later, and the assistance of Bright could have been secured for its demands, the history of its results might have been very different. There is too little in the book of the attitude adopted by the governing classes; the Times and Hansard would serve to show that a not unhealthy fear was generated that had its effect even upon Macaulay. Above all, Mr. Hovell, I believe, overestimates the degree to which the movement failed. Men are still to be found whose interest and creative effort in the labor movement is due to contact with the great memories represented by men like Vincent and Lovett. They created a tradition which the world will not willingly let die. Nor can the importance of Chartism as a protest be minimized. That it mitigated, by the potentialities of resistance it revealed, much of the harshness of industrialism few observers will deny. But, after all, these are but slight blemishes upon an admirable book. The war has deprived us of many whose powers were just beginning to ripen into a fulfillment that would have been precious. Arthur Heath among philosophers, H. J. Mosley among scientists, Nowell Sievers among students of politics, were the men in the Oxford of my generation who would certainly have taken a large part in the great intellectual movements of the next half-century; and this book of Hovell's is evidence that among historians he also would have occupied a distinguished place. H. J. L.

War's Insanity

Men in War, by Andreas Latzko. New York: Boni & Liveright. $1.50.

ANDREAS LATZKO is a Hungarian, once an officer in the Austrian army, and his sketches of Men in War, men in mortal agony, men in far worse than physical pain, are timely now that four years of weariness and smouldering hatred seem likely to set the whole patch-quilt empire ablaze. These Men in War suffered chiefly, perhaps, because they felt theirs to be a useless cause, their marches and bloody attacks to be the mere scheming of remote superiors, their deaths and wounds for interests not their own. A brave Englishman has well expressed it — "God, think of having to die for what they stand for!"

But Latzko speaks more than for Austria alone. He speaks as a man, he has felt the deepest suffering of the soldiers in this war, worse than a lost leg or a shattered body, the torture of the thing seen that cannot be forgotten, the horror that will not die. To shudder and reject his Men in War is too easy, and ignores in ourselves the grain of madness without which we are not human. We must try to understand them: the same thing may happen to ourselves almost any time.

The years of most of us pass slowly, barbed with occasional pain. Victims of a procession of minor annoyances, we are cursed chiefly with monotony, and build our happiness on the blessed faculty of forgetting unpleasant things. Hours dully spent die easily, and turn rose-colored in the midst of reminiscence. But let irritations come faster than we can throw their poison off, and gradually we lose the power to forget them. An evil curtain impalpably separates us from the world. Sudden horrors stick mercilessly in the mind, gnawing obsessions gain substance, breed like pale venomous ghosts; breaking into frenzy, they crowd out the day and fill a twilight mind with their lunatic and constant shapes. So he descends to unutterable darkness, a madman, who has lost the power to forget.

Between us at the rear and men at the front lie depths of suffering that perhaps nothing will ever bridge. It may be that some mysterious instinct of self-preservation makes incomplete our sympathy for maimed and crippled men, tinging our pity with repulsion. But a man whose mind has been shattered, whose soul has been twisted and uprooted by the war is doubly hard for us to understand. Hell's children are alien to our decent civilian Purgatory.

That any man can go through the hell of war untouched is unlikely, and Latzko trails dark clouds with him from the pits of suffering where he has been. The horrors he has seen obsess him, they make his eye more eager for truth inside the human mind than in the bright world about it. His very subjective descriptions show that the fraternity of horror in most of his characters is more than insight or observation. He has drunk deep of the bitter draught himself. And My Comrade, the diary of a mad officer in a hospital, seems more than half autobiography.

The memory of a wounded man, his face ploughed up and disfigured beyond all nightmares, follows him wherever he goes. The ghastly image is on the inside of his lids when he closes his eyes. It is like a railway trip the officer once took through the Bavarian Lakes: across the glory of the autumn landscape "there ran steadily an ugly black spot, a flaw in the window-pane. That is the way my obstinate comrade flits across woods and walls, stands still when I stand still, dances over the faces of passers-by, over the asphalt paving, wet from the rain, over everything my eyes happen to fall upon. He interposes himself between me and the world, just like that flaw in the window pane, which degraded everything I saw . . ."

The doctors laugh at him, say that dead men cannot be seen: "In their lives death plays no part . . . I know that the dead man's life within me is stronger than my own life . . . I should be the stronger of the two, they say. But you cannot kill a dead man."

He will not be told that he is sick, "It is the others that are sick. They are sick who gloat over news of victories and see conquered miles of territory rise resplendent above mounds of corpses . . . Am I to be cured of my memory as from an illness? . . . Is not memory the very highest possession of every human being?" And a throng of unspeakably bitter memories crowd about him, the ashen face of his boy as he left, the deathly stench of the creeping hospital trains, the soldier who greets him as he nears the front: "Yes, Lieutenant, here's the place for man salad." Bitterest of all, perhaps, the war correspondents, "looking as if they had stepped out of a Sherlock Holmes motion picture," who go gaily off in a carriage which might have taken the man with the nightmare wound, "My Comrade," back to the hospital. And every day the officer writes down anew his hatred and horror at war,

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THE OUTSTANDING MASTERPIECE OF THE WAR

IT is true that everyone doesn't want to read war books. A great many books are war books and nothing else, but even if "Men In War" were nothing else, it is hardly likely you would feel that you could afford to overlook the book which Theodore Dreiser says is "far and away the greatest war book I have yet read"; which the Philadelphia *Press* says is "by far the outstanding masterpiece of the war"; about which the New York *Evening Mail* writes "The war has produced two masterpieces, 'Under Fire' and 'Men In War' " and about which the New York *Evening Post* writes as follows: " 'Men In War' is notable among the war's great literary products. 'Under Fire' is realism, 'Men In War' is artistic realism. From it we get a total impression (of the war) that is more complete than that suggested by Barbusse."

But "Men In War" is more than a war book. Latzko is primarily a great literary artist, a word painter rarely equalled in the history of literature. Everybody is asking "Who is this Andreas Latzko? Is he really an Austrian army officer 'as advertised'?" The Chicago *Evening Post,* after saying " 'Men In War' is comparable only with 'Under Fire,' " questions whether the real name of the author is given, because the first edition of the book was published anonymously in Switzerland. The *Post* even questions whether the portrait bust of him that has recently appeared in so many of the newspapers is authentic. Andreas Latzko is not a pseudonym. The first edition of his book did not bear his name because he had not yet made his way to Switzerland from his Hungarian regiment. His name is printed on subsequent editions, and we shall shortly publish another book written by him.

It seems that nobody in this country had heard very much about Latzko or "Men In War" before last January, and we feel that it is a distinct achievement for a young publishing house to have its imprint on what is being called by the most competent critics in the country the greatest book the war has yet produced. Many people are congratulating us on what they call a peculiar stroke of good fortune. If good fortune consists in continually hunting for the best books that we can find, regardless of their apparent commerical value, we modestly accept the congratulations. Finding good books isn't an especially easy matter. Ninety-nine out of a hundred manuscripts that are submitted are valueless for our purposes. The great war has made it increasingly difficult to get good books from abroad. But on January 12th, the New York *Evening Post* published a long review of "Menschen im Krieg" (Men In War) which so impressed all of us that the Swiss edition of this book was immediately secured from a local bookstore, read that afternoon and evening, and at about three o'clock on Sunday morning we sent a cable offer to the Swiss publishers. About a week afterwards we received a reply that five offers had been made by cable by American publishers, but that as our offer was received first and was satisfactory, the book was ours.

We urge everybody who has confidence in the Boni & Liveright imprint to read "Men In War." Although the first edition of the book was not distributed until the second week of April, and although review copies were sent out only a couple of weeks ago, the book is now in its third edition and is creating more discussion than any book that has been published this year. Publications that received the book too late to print adequate reviews in the editions then going to press, felt it a work of such great importance that they printed pictures of Latzko with such captions as "The author of 'Men In War,' that observer and critic who cannot be neglected in making our estimate of the war" (N. Y. *Evening Sun.*) "This is a picture of Andreas Latzko, an Austrian officer, author of 'Men In War,' which has been described as as great a book as 'Under Fire'—review to appear shortly" (Chicago *Tribune.*") "Now comes Andreas Latzko's 'Men In War,' which lies unopened on my desk, but arrives recommended by an universal panegyric" (Detroit *News*".) Such treatment would hardly be accorded the book unless it were recognized as one of vital significance, not only as a human document treating of the war, but as a work of literary art. As the New York *Sun* says, "It has all the flaming red realism that characterizes many of the personal narratives of the war, but it has in addition, artistry and style that set it far above them. The author's imagery of description is vivid and individual, his metaphors apt and illuminating. Each of his characters is limned in such lifelike colors that we say they *are*. Inevitably it challenges comparison with 'Under Fire, and not to its disadvantage. 'Men In War' deserves to live."

"Men In War" has not only provoked unusual discussion because it is a great war book and a great work of art, but because of the fearlessness of its author, because of its outspoken detestation of Prussian ruthlessness and autocracy. Even though now in Switzerland, Latzko's whereabouts can hardly be unknown to the military-mad Prussian officials, who, it is said, are making every effort to apprehend him. Christopher Morley, who said in his review of the book in the Boston *Transcript* headed "The Infamy of the Teutons," " 'Men In War' is one of the big books of the war," added "If the Teutonic military authorities ever get hold of it, the author will go straight to a firing squad." The New York *Times* in reviewing the book says, "Bitterly, angrily, madly, Latzko attacks the Fatherland that fights not for defense but for conquest; the Fatherland whose simple folk are tricked and maimed and murdered by the cant and the greed of their rulers, the Fatherland whose war, let loose upon the world, this Austrian hates." *The Sun* wrote on April 28th, "This is no book for a Prussian and you may be sure that the volume will not be circulated in Germany." But we know that the book *has* been read in Germany, and that Latzko is wanted there.

It is impossible in the space available to indicate one-half of the criticism and comment that has appeared on this remarkable book, but we ask our readers whether the heading we have chosen for this advertisement seems extravagant on the evidence we have presented.

"Men In War" can be purchased wherever books are sold, for $1.50 per copy. If your dealer should be out of it temporarily, we will send it to you for $1.60 postpaid, and shall also be glad to send you our Spring catalog listing our miscellaneous publications and the fifty titles now included in the Modern Library.

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scattering the pages to the careless crowds in the street.

A more real and poignant figure is the composer in the first sketch of the book. He sits in the hospital gardens, stunned, shattered by the vision of a friend's hideous death. He scarcely notices that his pretty wife has come and sits beside him. She can only cry quietly, for between her and him is "an enigmatic resistance, an unexpected obstacle, which she could not beg away or cry away... Horror still gloomed in his eyes, and he kept gazing ahead of him darkly... Her eyes pierced the darkness, and her hands always went the same way, groping forward timidly, then quickly withdrawing as though scorched when his shrinking away in hatred threw her into despair again." Later, in a wild, mad outburst he shows the reason of his hatred for her, rooted in things older and deeper than the war. "She didn't shed a single tear when I left on the train. Did it surprise you to find out that the war is horrible? To find out that the women were horrible—that was the surprising thing. That they can smile and throw roses, that they can give up their men, their children... that was the surprise! That they gave us up—that they sent us—*sent* us! because every one of them would have been ashamed to stand there without a hero. Do you think we should have gone if they had not sent us? No general could have made us go if the women hadn't allowed us to be stacked on the trains, if they had screamed out that they would never look at us again if we turned into murderers. Once they had the chance to protect us, but all they cared about was being in style—nothing else but just being in style."

The Victor is in a different key. The war elevates an old general, whose only battles were to make both ends meet, into a state of almost fairy story omnipotence. His Excellency sits in front of the cheerful coffee house, master of the small headquarters town from which his stern order has banished the unseemly presence of convalescent soldiers. To an interviewing reporter he delivers a patriotic north-easter. But in a moment of folly the reporter asks His Excellency when he hopes for peace. The general's reaction, though silent, is thorough: "Hope for peace? What good was a general to expect from peace? In times of peace he was like a strict teacher in galloons, an old duffer who occasionally shouted himself hoarse out of pure ennui." Keenly ironical, sharp-sighted, this sketch has an undertone of the bitterest hatred.

And hatred is the note that gives its tremendous power to the book throughout. Latzko's world is quite clearly divided: he sees all men as for war or against it. Such a simplification of a universe where evil is really inextricably blended with good, and good with evil, makes the book none the less great in its narrow, passionate way. To read it is to taste deeply, unforgettably of the profoundest suffering of the human mind, to share an emotion which, in every land, will make war impossible some day.

R. L.

Contributors

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SERGEANT—A graduate of Bryn Mawr College. Has been in France for several months and is contributing a series of articles to the New Republic.

H. SIDEBOTHAM—Military critic of the Manchester Guardian.

H. N. BRAILSFORD—An English publicist, author of The War of Steel and Gold and other books on international affairs.

WILLIAM HARD—A writer on public affairs now investigating problems of organization in Washington for the New Republic.

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
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